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The article takes the distinction between public and private speech in the
areas ofpublic employment and defamation, where the leading cases are Connick v. Myers and Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., respectively, and shows the difficulty which the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have had in defining public and private speech in First Amendment
cases. The thrust of the article is to formulate a clearer definition suitable for
use by jurists and lawyers in First Amendment free-speech cases by resorting
to three writers ofphilosophicalbent who have addressedthe question of what
consitutes the "public": John Dewey, in The Public and Its Problems;
Hannah Arendt, in the chapter "The Public and the Private Realm" in her
book The Human Condition; and Walter Lippmann in The Public Philosophy. The articlefurther relates the views of Dewey, Arendt, and Lippmann to
conventional judicial and scholarly rationalesfor freedom of speech like the
instrumental rationale of political governance and the intrinsic rationale of
self-expression, especially as developed in the early formative period of freespeech values by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. In the course of the argument, the metaphilosophicalideas and methods of Richard P. McKeon are
used, in connection with the writers' views of what constitutes the "public," to
develop a model of convergence. This model of convergence is then used to
achieve the major goal of the article, philosophical clarification of the standards for identifying public and private speech in constitutional litigation. To
this end the model of convergence, employing a plurality of meanings for the
"public," is applied to the mass of confusing case law in the lower federal
courts, offering practical solutions to problems of conflict and ambiguity in
particularconcrete cases.

INTRODUCTION

Inherently vague, indefinite, and sometimes contradictory meanings
ascribed to "public" and to "private" speech make these concepts and
the distinction between them among the most troublesome in First
Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court developed these two
concepts in the 1980's in the areas of public employees' speech' and
defamation.2 In a process brought to fruition in the 1970's, the Court
had begun to distinguish high-value speech protected under the First
Amendment from low-value speech, by treating them as broad classes
of speech and by subjecting them to categorical balancing to define
the kinds of circumstances in which the distinction must be used not case-by-case balancing turning on the individual facts and interests
1. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
2. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (Powell, J., plurality) (White, J., concurring).
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in each case.3 In its attempts to differentiate high-value public speech
from low-value private speech, the Court appears to have retained elements of its general categorical balancing approach, but has also
mixed into its analysis individualized balancing of specific facts and
interests. It has also failed on occasion to make the distinction between public and private speech where the logic of its own case law
seems to require the distinction. Against this background of broadstroke attempts by the Supreme Court to define public and private
speech, the lower federal courts have struggled with the minutiae of
constant litigation - especially in the area of public employment - 4
to maintain a semblance of consistency in applying these concepts.
Thus the confusion in this area of the constitutional law of free speech
alone illustrates that "the Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to
devise a coherent theory of free expression."'
My inquiry is an attempt to resolve the problem of distinguishing
the "public" from the "private" in the context of First Amendment
protection of speech. In the course of this resolution I attempt to construct "a coherent theory of free expression," at least in this niche of
First Amendment jurisprudence, by establishing an analytical framework for making the distinction between public and private speech;
but it is not a unitary theory organized around a single controlling
doctrine or theory. Rather, I utilize a theory of ethical and philosophical pluralism to construct "the broadest range of purposes or values
that can coherently be thought to underlie the Free Speech Clause" 6 as
directed to public and private speech. I adapt to this end the thought
of the late Richard P. McKeon7 and especially his concepts of philosophic semantics and inquiry.8 Because, as McKeon says, "it is easy to
refute other philosophers within the framework of one's own [unitary]
philosophy," pluralism can provide a means to avoid facile and often
futile one-sided distortions of others' principles - distortions inherent in unified or monolithic methodologies - by "afford[ing] an alternative to the impossible task of discovering and expounding an
overarching doctrine to include whatever is good in all doctrines while
3. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 189, 194-95 (1983).

4. See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define
Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988).
5. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591
(1982).
6. R. George Wright, A Rationalefrom J.S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause, 1985
Sup. CT. REV. 149, 149 (emphasis added) (The author analyzed the writings of J.S.
Mill. For reasons stated I analyze a plurality of thinkers).
7. Late Professor on the Committee on Ideas and Methods, The University of
Chicago.
8. See RICHARD MCKEON, PhilosophicSemantics and PhilosophicInquiry (first
distributed in mimeograph, 1966), in FREEDOM AND HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS
242 (Zahava K. McKeon ed., 1990).
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avoiding what is false, or incomplete, or meaningless, or unessential." 9
The essence of forging compromise and coherence is found in the realization that agreement on action, not on rigid doctrinal theory, is
required. Thus the "philosophic problem of [freedom of speech] consists, not in the discovery of a single true philosophy in which all...
must agree, but rather in the discovery of [a] common course[] of
action and common solutions of problems on which men might agree
for different reasons."' 0
The thread of my argument throughout is that philosophy can come
to the aid of the law in resolving certain legal issues, and that the
highly conflicted First Amendment law concerning the meaning of
public and private speech particularly lends itself to such a resolution
facilitated through philosophical thought. The general justifications
given by the Supreme Court for freedom of speech frequently approach or even attain a philosophical level and thus are compatible
with germane ideas generated by nonlegal but practical thinkers of
philosophical bent. Moreover, because the Court has not fashioned a
coherent doctrine specifically for distinguishing public and private
speech, resort is in order to other sources for specific and well reasoned analysis on this issue, and such nonlegal thinkers are an obvious
source. The writers whom I have selected have the additional advantage of having specifically addressed the nature of the public and the
private in the twentieth century American context, and one - Walter
Lippmann - was even a preeminent journalist who involved himself
in numerous public controversies. Finally, the philosophical approach
which I take here is compatible with legal reasoning because its ultimate aim is to resolve issues and to justify decisions in concrete situations. Ideas about and rationales for freedom of speech take on a
practical coloration in a context of action. As I shall argue throughout, philosophical pluralism adapted to the needs of the law in a democratic society promotes judicial decision-making by focusing on
possibilities for compromise and the adjustment of interests, not on
the construction of grand theories which obscure the traditional concern of legal reasoning, as a species of practical reason, with the particulars of each case.
My inquiry into the concepts of public and private speech accordingly, and as indicated, proceeds, strongly influenced by this pluralistic
approach, into an analysis of the three major underlying values commonly held by the Supreme Court to support constitutional speech:
the marketplace theory of truth, self-governance, and self-realization
9. RICHARD McKEON, FREEDOM AND HISTORY: THE SEMANTICS OF PHILOSOPHICAL CONTROVERSIES AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS 23-24 (1952), reprintedin FREEDOM AND HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 174-75 (Zahava K. McKeon ed., 1990) [all
citations hereinafter to the 1990 reprinted edition].
10. Richard McKeon, A Philosophy for UNESCO, 8
RES. 573, 577 (1948).
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(or self-expression)." To determine whether all or any of these judicially acknowledged major values is linked to more specific notions of
public speech usable by the Court, I turn to and analyze the philosophical but compatible thought of three significant American thinkers, each of whom has written cogently and coherently on the nature
of the public and each of whom has done so from the perspective of
one of the more general, judicially recognized First Amendment values. Thus John Dewey has written from the need for pragmatic selfgovernance; 12 Hannah Arendt, from the perspective of self-expression; 13 and Walter Lippmann, from the perspective of a timeless truth

(but not precisely a "marketplace of ideas" as usually understood in
First Amendment jurisprudence).' 4 The general methodology and approach to issues of social valuation of two of these figures - Dewey
and Arendt - correspond to the methods and approaches of two First
Amendment giants - Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis,
respectively. Lippmann's place in the inquiry is more difficult to assess, but his version of truth, though different in source from Holmes',
is nonetheless directed toward the pragmatic aim of action. The organizing principles of each of these figures concerning the value and
nature of the public are then applied to the tangled case law. My
conclusion is that the three major values supporting the protections of
the First Amendment, as expounded by the three figures analyzed in
depth, support a congruent and convergent - rather than a conflicted
basis for resolving the public/private speech controversy in favor of
an expanded and more readily defined scope of public speech, with a
clearer space for private speech as well.
I open the article in Part I with an analysis of the justifications for
free speech as distilled from the path-breaking and majestic opinions
of Justices Holmes and Brandeis and relate these views, which have
judicial "certificates of title," so to speak, to the nonlegal, and thus
"uncertified" but compatible and more subject-specific views of my
three writers on the nature of the "public." In Part II, I temporarily
interrupt this endeavor to connect judicial thought to kindred philosophical nonlegal ideas by interjecting a review of the relevant case
law developed in the Supreme Court. I focus on the vague standards
of "content, form, and context" for distinguishing public from private
speech developed in the seminal public employment case of Connick
v. Myers, 5 as well as the impasse which the Court has reached on this
issue in its line of defamation cases beginning with New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan.'6 I resume, in Part III, my attempt to connect legal
11. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 3, at 228.
12. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927).
13. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
14. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (Transaction Publishers 1989)
(1955).
15. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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thought to pertinent nonlegal thought, first, by explaining how philosophical pluralism promotes and influences this connection, and second, by explaining the major precepts of Dewey, Arendt, and
Lippmann that bear on their respective conceptions of the "public"
and the "private." These explanations are a propaedeutic for the culmination of the article in Part IV, where I bring the strands of
Supreme Court doctrine, philosophical views, and outstanding case
law issues together. Thus in Part IV, I define what I mean by "convergence" and then apply the technique of convergence so defined to
resolve a number of issues generated in the lower courts' decisions
because of conflicting or otherwise unsatisfactory interpretations of
underdeveloped Supreme Court precedent. These issues include the
problem of the speaker's motivation considered under the rubric of
"context" in the public employment cases, and the question of
whether a public figure can have a private life (and thus be the subject
of private speech) in the defamation cases. With this introduction
complete, I now proceed to the arguments in chief.
I.

THE THREE MAJOR VALUES SUPPORTING FIRST AMENDMENT
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THEIR JUDICIAL ORIGINS AND
THEIR CONNECTIONS TO PHILOSOPHICAL
CONCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC SPEECH

The volume of judicial and scholarly discussion about the values underlying the constitutional protection of free speech has been enormous, and it is not my purpose here to canvass that vast literature.
Rather, as indicated in the introduction, I will be concerned primarily
with three major values or purposes generally agreed to be associated
with freedom of speech: democratic participation in political decisionmaking, self-expression or self-realization, and advancement of
knowledge and the search for truth.'7 It is simply my present aim to
trace these fundamental values to deeply rooted judicial sources in
First Amendment jurisprudence and then to show the linkages between these sources and the conceptions of the "public" held by
Dewey, Arendt, and Lippmann.
Ronald Dworkin, in a book review of Anthony Lewis's Make No
Law: The Sullivan Case and the FirstAmendment,'8 distinguishes between "two main groups" of "justifications for the free speech and
press clauses":
The first [justification] treats free speech as important instrumentally, that is, not because people have any intrinsic moral right to say
17. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON,

THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

6-7

(1970) (Here I exclude a fourth value given by Emerson, achievement of a more stable community, because it seems to be included with the political value of self-government as I treat it.); Stone, supra note 3, at 228.
18. ANTHONY

LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST

AMENDMENT (1991).
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what they wish, but because allowing them to do so will produce
good effects for the rest of us....
The second kind of justification of free speech supposes that freedom of speech is valuable, not just in virtue of the consequences it
has, but because it is an essential and constitutive feature of a just
political society that government treat all its adult members ... as

responsible moral agents.' 9
Dworkin associates the first, or instrumental justification of free
speech with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' "great dissent" in Abrams
v. United States.2° According to Dworkin, "Holmes declared in his
Abrams dissent [that] politics is more likely to discover truth and eliminate error, or to produce good rather than bad policies, if political
discussion is free and uninhibited."'" Thus "the instrumental [justification] . . . concentrates mainly on the protection of political

speech." 22 This emphasis on the political value of free speech found
in Holmes also includes the "instrumental argument Holmes... made
in his Abrams dissent, in which he said that truth emerges in a free
23
market of ideas.
In contrast, Dworkin associates the second, or constitutive justification of free speech with Justice Louis Brandeis' "remarkably insightful
and comprehensive dissent in Whitney [v. California24 ]."25 The kind
of justification found there, Dworkin declares, goes beyond the scope
of promoting democratic self-governance to a "more active, aspect as
well: a responsibility.., to form convictions of one's own ... [and] to

express these [convictions] to others."26 Thus "the constitutive justification extends, in principle, to all aspects of speech or reflection in
which moral responsibility demands independence."27 Indeed, Brandeis' genius lay in his view that " 'free speech is valuable both as an
end and as a means,' "28 a view, as Dworkin explains, that both instrumental promotion of the political good and constitutive support of
self-expression "are needed in order fully to explain First Amendment
29
law."

When Holmes' and Brandeis' judicial views were delivered in the
early part of this century, they were distinctly minority, dissenting
19. Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles over Free Speech,

THE

N.Y.

REV.

BOOKS, 55, 56 (June 11, 1992) (book review) (second emphasis added).
20. 250 U.S. 616, 624-631 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21. Dworkin, supra note 19, at 56.
22. Id. at 57.
23. Id. at 57-58.
24. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., [formally or technically] concurring).
25. Dworkin, supra note 19, at 57.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting from Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375).
29. Id.
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9

opinions.30 Dworkin states the currently accepted view that "[b]y the
1960s, the great Holmes and Brandeis dissents had become orthodoxy."'" This is the position that I begin with now: that Holmes' and
Brandeis' dissenting opinions in Abrams and Whitney, respectively, illustrate the concepts of political self-governance, moral self-expression, and the search for truth and knowledge - all First Amendment
values that form the current bedrock of judicial thought and that can
be linked to conceptions of the "public" and thus to one or more conceptions and valuations of public speech.
A.

The Instrumental Value of PoliticalSelf-Governance
1. Holmes' Position and Its Relation to Dewey's

The classical and most comprehensive expression of Justice Holmes'
valuation of free speech is found, of course, in his dissenting opinion
in Abrams v. United States.32
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition
by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as
when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not
care whole heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your
power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate
is the theory of our constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment.33
This passage reveals some critical views of Justice Holmes: a skepticism of the purportedly self-evident truth of any idea or opinion and a
commitment to toleration of different ideas and thus to value plural30. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., [formally or technically] concurring).
31. Dworkin, supra note 19, at 55. See also, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (per curiam) (overruling the majority opinion in Whitney, against which
Brandeis, joined by Holmes, had dissented); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 125 & n.29 (1991) ("Although modern Justices endlessly recall ringing
judicial pronunciamentos on behalf of free speech from early history, these famous
declarations were not usually found in majority opinions." (citing Holmes' dissent in
Abrams and Brandeis' dissent [concurrence] in Whitney)).
32. 250 U.S. at 624-31.
33. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
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ism; 34 a pragmatic, empirical, "experiment[al]" approach to the development of governmental institutions and law; 35 and finally - and
most importantly for my inquiry here - the instrumental value of
"free trade in ideas" to "the ultimate good desired" - the very legitimacy of constitutional self-governance. "Holmes' principle that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
competition with other ideas and that truth is the only ground for
long-term successful action ... is the principle of liberal democracy. "36
In all these viewpoints connected with free speech - toleration of
competing social and political values, commitment to the process of
discussing ideas as a principal means of molding and preserving the
functions of public institutions, and especially reliance on empirical,
pragmatic grounds for testing the validity of public values - Justice
Holmes' thought bears a strong resemblance to the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey, particularly as expressed in the latter's The Public
and Its Problems.37 The principal difference between Holmes and
Dewey - a difference in the substantive content of their thought
which stands in contrast to their virtual agreement on the role of
speech in democratic process - lies in the divergent uses they would
make of speech in reforming or reconstituting political society. While
Dewey would use speech instrumentally to effect a comprehensive
reformation of political society, possibly requiring a break with existing political forms,'3 Holmes would confine the use of freedom of
speech to a more circumscribed and minimalist role - that of allowing the competition among ideas to be carried out in a peaceful
manner, thereby serving as a kind of "safety valve" for dissent and
thus assuring in some sense the simple survival of the existing institutions of government from the threat of violent overthrow.39 Yet
34. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[A] constitution is ... made for people of fundamentally differing views ....

35. Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1915).
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the 14th Amendment
beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social
experiments that an important part of the community desires.., even though
the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose
judgment I most' respect.
Id. at 344 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See also Sheldon M. Novick, The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression,
1991 Sup. CT. REV. 303, 326-27, 383 (Holmes eschewed natural-law or abstract principles of law in favor of legal positivism and the a posterioriderivation of legal principles from the process of legal reasoning itself).
36. RICHARD McKEON, DEMOCRACY IN A WORLD OF TENSIONS 194, 210 (McKeon ed., 1951).
37. DEWEY, supra note 12. See also infra note 163 and accompanying text. For a
comparison of the similarities and differences between Holmes and Dewey as pragmatic thinkers, see generally Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41
STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989).
38. See DEWEY, supra note 12 and accompanying text at 15, 31, 67.
39. Cf. Novick, supra note 35, at 348-49, and accompanying text (stating that
Holmes tended to take a minimalist view of the instrumental value of free speech to
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Holmes would abandon this minimalism and bow to the ultimate
power of words as expressed in "free trade in ideas," if indeed the
thought contained in those words had the power to sweep away existing governmental forms. Holmes expressed this view (rather fatalistically) in the extreme context of the times created by the distrust
and fear of revolutionary Bolshevism: "If in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by
the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way."4
Thus Holmes and Dewey share a powerful commitment to the role
of speech in determining the outcomes of the democratic political process. Their shared view on the generally pragmatic role and value of
speech to the maintenance or transformation of political society becomes significant, I shall argue, in the specific context of identifying
and justifying public speech. It becomes significant because Dewey,
consistently with the instrumental political value of free speech as exemplified in Holmes' judicial thought, elaborates a coherent theory of
the "public" which enables us to illumine the meaning of "public
speech" for this instrumental, political value.
2. The Paramountcy of the Political in Established First
Amendment Values
The Supreme Court "has [in a number of its important cases] recognized that expression on public issues 'has always rested on the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.' [Thus] '[s]peech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government.' "' Two aspects of the Supreme Court's treat-

ment in this grouping of cases are noteworthy: the political relation of
free speech to "the essence of self-government" establishes the paramount value of such speech, and speech concerned with "public issues" and "public affairs" is -

at least in a general way -

defined

and justified primarily by its instrumental relation to self-government,
and only to a lesser degree by its value as "self-expression." To be
sure, the concept of "political" has been given a broad meaning and
scope by the Court: it concerns "all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with
the exigencies of their period"42 - a formulation which both reveals
the instrumental relation of free speech (and the information it generself-governance, finding that peaceful discourse is essential to the very survival of

government).
40. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

41. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Carey v. Brown,.447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
42. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). See also First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (citing Thornhill's formulation of the public's need
for information as lying "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection").
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ates) to the needs of the "public" and which is remarkably similar to
Dewey's view of the instrumental role of the process of discussion to
resolution of "the public's" problems. The Court, however, has not
blotted out other free-speech values by its holdings in this genre of
cases:
It is no doubt true that a central purpose of the First Amendment
" 'was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.' " But

our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical[,] social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters - to take
a nonexhaustive list of labels - is not entitled to full First Amendment protection. 43
Indeed, the late Harry Kalven, Jr. - one of the most praised of
First Amendment scholars -

has stated:

The Amendment has a 'central meaning' - a core of protection
without which democracy cannot function .... This is not [, how-

ever,] the whole meaning of the Amendment. There are other freedoms protected by it. But at the [political] center there is no doubt
what speech is being protected and no doubt why it is being
protected."
The upshot is that, even at the high-water mark of its reliance on
political self-governance to justify instrumentally the value of free
speech, as explained from the cases above, the Supreme Court has left
a place for justification of a different type - especially, as I hope to
confirm - the constitutive value of free speech as self-expression.
But it is worth noting that one branch of First Amendment scholarship would -

in contrast to the Supreme Court -

confine the polit-

ical value of free speech very narrowly.
3. The Exclusivity of the Political - A Minority View
Two First Amendment scholars have argued that the sole justification for free speech is the instrumental one of political self-governance, very narrowly defined. They are Robert H. Bork and Lillian R.
BeVier. Bork has argued that "[w]here constitutional materials do
not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no principled way
to prefer any claimed human value to any other. The judge must
[therefore] stick close to the text and the history [of the constitutional
provision in question],... and not construct new rights.""

It follows

43. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) and Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29,41 (1971) (plurality opinion) (" 'The guarantees for speech and press are not the
preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs.' " (quoting Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967))).
44. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 208.
45. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971).
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ineluctably from this premise, according to Bork, that "[tihe category
of protected speech should consist of speech concerned with governmental behavior, policy, or personnel, whether the governmental unit
involved is executive, legislative, judicial or administrative. Explicitly
political speech is speech about how we are governed .... ,46 BeVier
similarly argues that "[t]he constitutional establishment of a representative democracy implies certain conclusions about the type of speech
the amendment must protect from abridgment. The amendment's irreducible minimum coverage is 'speech concerned with governmental
behavior, policy or personnel.' "'I
Bork and BeVier prefer legal reasoning that proceeds, to the greatest extent possible, on the basis of literal or univocal terms, rather
than on the basis of analogy, which - though utterly essential to
some irreducible, degree to all legal reasoning - is nonetheless, in
their view, prone to excesses. As Bork states it: "[P]rogression by
analogy from one case to the next, [is] an indispensable but perilous
method of legal reasoning .... If the.., progression is not to become
an analogical stampede, the protection of the first amendment . . .
must be cut off when it reaches the outer limits of political speech." 48
Likewise BeVier criticizes Alexander Meiklejohn's analogizing of art
and other expressive values to political speech with the comment that
"[a] wholesale analogy of art and literature to political speech seems
desperately attenuated."49 By the same token they tend to be empiricists or positivists because of their reliance on textual and historical
indicia of constitutional norms. They also tend, from McKeon's viewpoint, to be reductionist because they see in history and in its "basic
laws.., a science of human action which is the same for all men, at all
times, and in all places."5 Change itself is explained by these constant underlying "laws" of human nature,5 ' or as Bork himself has
stated from the bench: "The world changes in which unchanging values find their application."52
The quasi-scientific, positivist approach taken by Bork and BeVier,
especially as it reflects their distaste for analogical reasoning and their
preference for literal terms, can be understood in connection with
46. Id. at 27-28.
47. Lillian R. BeVier, The FirstAmendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry Into
the Substance and Limits of Principle,30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 309 (1978) (quoting from

Bork, supra note 45, at 27-28).
48. Bork, supra note 45, at 27 (emphasis added). Despite his later recantation of
insistence on rejection of analogical legal reasoning, ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 333 (1990), Bork still
views the use of analogy with skepticism. "Judges and lawyers live on the slippery
slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski it to the bottom." Id. at 169.
49. BeVier, supra note 47, at 356-57.
50. McKEON, supra note 9, at 209-10.
51. Id.

52. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
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Professor McKeon's "logistic" mode of thought. 53 I mention this
point here only as a prelude to a later portion of my inquiry, where I
will use other McKeonite modes of thought to set into perspective the
free-speech values of broad political instrumentalism (as represented
by Dewey), constitutive political self-expression (as represented by
Arendt), and the search for truth in the context of action (as represented by Lippmann). This narrow political valuation of free speech,
which I will hereafter attribute simply to Bork, has - so far as I know
no corresponding writer of philosophical bent (such as Dewey, Arendt, or Lippmann) who more fully develops the presuppositions behind this line of thought and then uses them to articulate a conception
of the "public." Moreover, the Borkian position has never been favored by either the political or judicial branches of the government.54
For these reasons the Borkian position of a narrow, exclusively political justification for freedom of speech receives a truncated treatment
in my inquiry, limited either to the role of a dialectical foil for the
explication of my own ideas, or as a bare complement to the other
First Amendment values more adequately represented for the purpose of this inquiry - more adequately represented because they are
more conducive, given the nature of my argument, to understanding
various conceptions of public (and private) speech.
I now turn to the other great type of First Amendment justification,
constitutive expression (as described by Dworkin), which complements and extends political instrumentalism.
The Constitutive Value of Self-Realization or Self-Expression
1. Brandeis' Position and Its Relation to Arendt's Conception of
Self-Realization Through Politics
The greatest authority for self-expression found in First Amendment jurisprudence
is Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Whitney v.
5s
B.

California:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
state was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordina-

53. McKEON, supra note 9, at 167-68 (" 'Logistic' methods are employed to construct systems of proof on the model of the mathematical deductions of geometry by
giving simple terms literal and univocal definitions, by establishing simple relations
among them, and by proceeding ... [according to] deductive reasoning . . .
54. See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
55. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., [formally or technically] concurring).
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rily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this
56 should be a fundamental principle of the American government.

Brandeis thus finds political democracy and personal fulfillment to
be essentially related. Speech is the interconnecting link - "both as
an end and as a means" - by which each is realized; and there is no
ultimate distinction between the speech that addresses politics and the
speech that provides self-realization. By this measure, then, speech is
more than a mere means to democratic self-rule and personal expression: it is the constitutive or intrinsic manifestation of the human spirit
itself, the spontaneous existential expression of "the freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think." The merger of the political and
the personal contexts into a single milieu in which speech fulfills its
constitutive role - or, stated differently, the idea that speech is the
end or telos through which the political and the person emerge together in tandem - is a notion that originated in Greek antiquity.
There is, in fact, scholarly evidence that Brandeis held the Greeks of
ancient Athens in high esteem, and that his Whitney dissent is directly
traceable in large part to Pericles' Funeral Oration - extolling the
civic virtues of Athenian democracy - as reported by Thucydides.57
"In short, to discover how the model political human being would
political society, Brandeis turned to the [anfunction in the model
58
cient] Athenians.
In asserting the inseparability of personal and political self-realization, a vision with roots in the history of citizen participation in the
public life of ancient Greek democracy, Brandeis presents a view and
a constitutive justification for free speech that is remarkably similar to
Hannah Arendt's in The Human Condition, both in its substance and
in its philosophical mode of expression. Arendt, like Brandeis (but
writing a generation later), views politics as the place where words (as
well as deeds) provide human fulfillment as an end in itself;5 9 and, like
Brandeis, she models her vision of human fulfillment after the ancient
Greeks.' Both give self-expression a predominantly political coloration, rather than associating it with expression in the arts or in literature (as some Supreme Court decisions have done 61); but certainly
neither denies the authenticity of these other avenues of expression.
Both Brandeis' and Arendt's notions are consistent with "civic humanism . . . the view that man is a social, even a political, animal
56. Id. at 375 (emphases added).
57. Vincent Blasi, The FirstAmendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 680-82 (1988).
58. Id. at 682 (quoting P. STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE
237-38 (1984)).
59. See infra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
60. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
61. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

15

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

whose essential nature is most fully realized in a democratic society in
which there is widespread and vigorous participation in political
life." 62 Certainly some such view must have been what Brandeis had
in mind by his Whitney remark that "public discussion is a political
duty." Because Arendt extends and elaborates this view of existential

and political self-realization through speech, her consequent treatment of the concept of the "public" and the role of speech in that
more specific context is - like Dewey's extension of Holmes' more
general thought to a specific conception of the "public" - a most
plausible resource from which to explicate the term "public speech"

when viewed according to a major free-speech value: here, selfexpression. 63

2. Self-Expression as an Englobing Principle
Rejected Pluralism

-

An Example of

In their scholarly work two current legal thinkers, Martin H. Redish
and Michael J. Perry, treat self-expression as an englobing principle

which assimilates all other free-speech values. Thus Redish asserts
that "free speech ultimately serves only one true value

. .

. 'individual

self-realization.' "I6He further contends that other free-speech values
like the "political process" [or the] "marketplace-of-ideas ...though
65

perfectly legitimate, are in reality subvalues of self-realization.

Perry argues that freedom of expression "as an instrument for the

maintenance of the democratic process" merges with "the value of
'self-realization' " into "one category. ' 66
62. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 206 & n.38 (1993).
63. Unlike the value of instrumental promotion of self-governance, which has
been supported by judicial opinion and scholarly writing -that carry forward Holmes'
initial formulation of the paramountcy of the political, see supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text, the concept of self-expression has not received such widespread
case law support (except, of course, for the great pinnacle of support for it by Brandeis in Whitney), and that which it has received is generally supportive of nonpolitical
expression. Cf., e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures,
programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical
and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee."); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) ("The First Amendment protects works which . . .have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value . . . ."). Of course, as previously
indicated, the prevailing view of the value of political instrumentalism leaves plenty of
space for self-expressive values, see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text, and
Brandeis' (and Arendt's) emphasis on political self-expression makes them natural
allies of this prevailing view. Robert Bork, in contrast and true to his claim for the
exclusivity of political instrumentalism (narrowly construed) as the First Amendment's sole support, takes up and rejects all parts of the Brandeis Whitney concurrence that he finds to exceed the narrow value of "[tihe discovery and spread of
political truth." Bork, supra note 45, at 23-26.
64. Redish, supra note 5, at 593.
65. Id. at 594.
66. Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine,
78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1137, 1142-43 (1983) (first emphasis added).
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The use of such an assimilative approach that folds different or even
apparently contrary concepts into one broad principle in support of
freedom of speech conflicts, like Bork's approach, with the pluralistic
aim of my inquiry - but in a different way. Whereas Bork places all
his argumentative weight on one free-speech value and then intensifies his implicit denial of pluralism by making that one value very narrow, Perry and Redish also place all their weight on one value but
then further deny in effect the basis for pluralism by using their value
-

broadly construed -

to absorb all other possibilities. To the ex-

tent that Redish's and Perry's assimilative monistic approaches deny
the existence of other kinds of First Amendment values as spelled out
in this inquiry, it must be dismissed as destructive of pluralism, even
though the effect of their approaches may be to grant far greater constitutional protection to speech than would Bork's. In adhering to a
pluralistic viewpoint, I attempt to steer between the Scylla of Bork's
narrow doctrinalism and the Charybdis of any broad englobing
theory.
C. The Meaning of the Search for Truth in Connection with the
"Marketplace of Ideas"
It is a commonplace notion that the search for truth is a principal
purpose of the First Amendment's protection of speech.6 7 The classic
expression of this normative fact remains Justice Holmes' dissent, previously quoted, in Abrams v. United States: "[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market ...."68 Holmes' approach to truth, however (and as already suggested 69 ), does not in-

voke a disinterested, passionless search for truth; rather, it is
instrumentally and pragmatically related to action. Holmes' viewpoint has often been compared to the utilitarian thought of J. S. Mill,
who also treated truth (in ethical and political matters) as a practical
concern rather than as a purely abstract matter.7 ° Indeed, McKeon
has found a very great similarity between Holmes' and Mill's purposes
and methodologies for discovering truth:
John Stuart Mill['s] practical use of the free interplay of opposed
arguments [in On Liberty] .. .[also] underlies Justice Oliver Wen-

dell Holmes' vision of the free competition of ideas.... Dialogue is
67. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
68. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
70. See JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 28 (1859; Pelican ed. 1974) ("Truth, in the
great practicalconcerns of life, is ...made by the rough process of a struggle between
combatants .

. . .")

(emphasis added).
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statement and counterstatement, based on ordinary ways of life and
ordinary uses of language, with no possible appeal to a reality beyond opposed opinions except through opinions about reality.
Truth is perceived in perspective, . . . but there is no overarching
inclusive perspective. Meanings are defined in action and measurement, and there is no theory apartfrom practice. Method is the art
of seizing and interpreting the opinions of others and of constructing and defending one's own. Virtue is method translated into intelligent self-interest and respect for others.7 '

The upshot is that the truth of Holmes (like the truth of Mill in On
Liberty) is closely associated with action, and thus is practical - not
theoretic - truth. The problem addressed "is not a dialectical or metaphysical problem of determining what right choice or wisdom is ... ;
[rather,] it is a political and a casuistic problem .... ,,72 The Supreme
Court itself has, years after Abrams, agreed with this interpretation of
Holmesian truth. The protection afforded by the First Amendment to
speech, according to the Court, "extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated to action. The first amendment is a charter for government, not for an institution of learning. 'Free trade in ideas' means...' 73
the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts.
The writer whom I have chosen to represent and explicate the freespeech value of the search for truth (and to develop from his explica-

tion a more specific conception of the "public") - Walter Lippmann
- has a viewpoint that fits somewhat uneasily into the practical, instrumental rubric established for truth and knowledge set forth by
Holmes. Lippmann's version of truth arises from the notion of tran71. McKEON, supra note 9, at 113-14 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 77.
73. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945) (referring expressly to Holmes in
internally quoted segment) (emphasis added). Academic freedom might be an exception to the rule that the Court associates the search for truth with the paramountcy of
the political. The leading case in support of academic freedom understood as the
disinterested search for truth appears to be Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion and Frankfurter, J., concurring opinion). But
even here the search for truth is associated to some extent with political ends, e.g.:
"The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost selfevident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth." Id. at 250 (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion).
For society's good - if understanding be an essential need of society -

inquiries into the[ ] problems [of the natural and social sciences], speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left
as unfettered as possible. Political power must abstain from intrusion into
this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government and the
people's well-being ....

Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring opinion) (all emphasis added).
Indeed, Professor Schauer maintains that "virtually all of the Supreme Court's references to academic freedom have been little more than excess verbiage." Frederick
Schauer, "Private" Speech and the "Private" Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School

District, 1979 Sup. CT.

REV.

217, 244.
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scendent ideas or a nonempirical world behind the world. 74 Thus
Lippmann's source of truth is metaphysical in the classical sense of
that term, not the conflicting and self-interested opinions of men
about worldly affairs relied upon by Holmes. 75 Yet there is not a hiatus between Holmes and Lippmann on the use of truth, for in The
Public Philosophy Lippmann is plainly concerned with bringing truth
down from the heavens to provide the most practical kind of direction
in the affairs of men.76 Just how well Lippmann's thought will enable
me to develop a specific conception of public speech from the First
Amendment value of the search for truth remains, because of Lippmann's genuinely metaphysical conception of the source of truth,
something of an open question.
II.

THE NATURE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SPEECH IN THE CASE LAW

I have now illustrated the general configurations of First Amendment free-speech values. It remains to be shown how the related but
specific distinction between public and private speech has developed
in the particulars of the case law before I place these values in the
context of my proposed schema of convergence to clarify the distinction. This distinction originated in two areas, as I have already noted:
public employment and defamation.
A.

Public Employment

In Pickering v. Board of Education,77 the Supreme Court established the distinction underlying the difference between public and
private speech when it ruled that "[tihe problem ... is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. '78 The emphasis is on the dual
role of the public employee: as a citizen among other free and equal
citizens, he must not be barred from his equal share of, or claim to, the
right of free speech; but as an employee, he must be subjected to the
discipline of the workplace whose efficient functioning, after all, also
promotes the public good and is no less recognizable on this account
than is free speech. The result is the balancing of two interests: first,
the employee's interest in speaking associated with his role as a citizen
entitled to address public affairs, as distinct from and against, second,
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (including quotation).
See infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
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the government's interest in avoiding disruptive impact on workplace
efficiency caused by speech of its employees.
A broad definition of.disruption [as implicitly adopted in Pickering]
enables the government employer to restrict employee speech that
directly impairs government efficiency (by, for example, interrupting the normal office routine or distracting [other] workers) as well

as [to restrict] speech that reveals the employee's own incompetence, creates
79 'disharmony' among other workers, or demonstrates
disloyalty.

Such a definition also protects the government's " 'need to set out a
uniform official position.' "80
In two successive cases the Court first seemed to increase the burden on the public employee by requiring him to prove that opposition
to his speech was a substantial motivating factor in causing his discharge or other unfavorable treatment by the public employer,8 ' yet
seemed to lessen the same burden by not'requiring the employee to
make her statement to a public, open, or general audience, at least
when it concerns subject matter of special public importance.82 The
83
latter ruling, in Givhan v. Western Line ConsolidatedSchool District,
appears to have been that speech can be both private (in its restricted
extent of dissemination) and public (in subject matter) at the same
time, with subject matter controlling for assignment of constitutional
protection. Then came Connick v. Myers,84 which remains the center-

piece of the Court's effort to structure the proper constitutional analysis of public speech in the public employment cases.
In Connick v. Myers,85 the Supreme Court attempted to systematize
its prior doctrine on public and private speech in public employment.
The first and most important point to note is that the Court grounded
the distinction in the necessity of public employees to have the political right to "participate in public affairs," 86 and particularly in its interpretation of the rationale of the Pickering line of cases as having
79. D. Gordon Smith, Beyond "Public Concern": New Free Speech Standardsfor
Public Employees, 57 U. Cni. L. REV. 249, 252 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at 252 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74
CAL. L. REV. 889, 919 (1986)).

81. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).
82. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (permitting
statement to be made to an audience of one when the "audience" was speaker's superior and statement was about racial discrimination). See generally, Frederick Schauer,
"Private" Speech and the "Private" Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School District,
1979 Sup. CT. REV. 217, 244.

83. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
84. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
85. Id.

86. Id. at 144-45 (citing political or self-government cases such as New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1964); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)). See supra
notes 1, 4, 39 and accompanying text.
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arisen in the same "understanding of the First Amendment" -

the

need to "safeguard[ ] speech on matters of public concern.""7 The

Court accordingly relied directly on the instrumental value of speech
to the political process in its identification and valuation of public
speech, 88 and not on any constitutive value of self-expression. Secondly, and also very important for this inquiry, the Court broke in two
(1) the analysis of whether a public employee's speech constitutes "a
matter of public speech" or merely private speech, and (2) the Picker-

ing-style balancing of the effect of the speech on employer efficiency.
If the speech were on a matter of public concern (as determined in (1)
or "prong one," above), a court should proceed to balance (in (2) or
"prong two," above) the various interests of the parties in the individual case. If on a private matter, the dispute would be resolved in favor

of the employer without balancing.89
The two prongs of the Connick inquiry correspond to two well accepted methods of analysis under current First Amendment jurisprudence. Prong one (concerned with the distinction between public and
private speech) corresponds to analysis of content-based restrictions
requiring broad classification of speech - by a method frequently referred to as "categorical balancing" - into separate subject matters.
These broad subject matters or categories of speech are then denominated as "high-value," "low-value," or perhaps are assigned utterly no
value under the First Amendment. On the other hand, prong two of
Connick corresponds to scrutiny of content-neutral restrictions requiring case-by-case balancing of particular factors in individual cases. 90
Connick is accordingly a hybrid case, combining the First Amendment
valuation techniques of categorization and interest balancing. My in87. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (emphasis added).
88. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
90. See Stone, supra note 3, at 194-95. Professor Tribe refers to the two types of
First Amendment analysis as "track one" (where the restriction is aimed at the communicative impact of the speech) and as "tract two" (where the restriction is aimed at
the noncommunicative impact of the speech). LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 12-2, at 789 (2d ed. 1988).

This approach also dovetails with Professor Ely's thesis that, in part because "categorization" and "balancing" should not be regarded as mutually exclusive theories,
categorization should on occasion be "employed in tandem" with particularized balancing in a content-protective sense, as "[a]n adjustment" for supposed content-neutral restrictions that in fact "singl[e] certain messages out for prohibition and . . .
certain messages ... for protection." John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1500-01 (1975). The supplementation of categorization with
occasional protective balancing is required because "the [government] obviously can
move, and often does, 'simply' to control the time, place or manner out of a concern
for the likely effect of the communication on its audience." Id. at 1498. Because Ely
views balancing here as aiding in protecting speech content, he would a fortiori be
loathe to mingle counter-protective factors (like disruption of workplace efficiency)
with Connick's prong-one assessment of speech value in a way that could weaken
protection for such speech.
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quiry here proceeds only into the first branch or the threshold of Connick analysis, namely, whether the speech in question is of public
concern or is only private, and does not attempt to assay the balancing
of competing interests in the individual public employment cases.
The Court saw its immediate purpose in Connick to prevent "every
criticism directed at a public official [from] plant[ing] the seed of a
constitutional case."'" The dispute in Connick arose when an assistant

district attorney passed out a questionnaire, directly critical of her
superiors, to her co-workers. The Court interpreted all but one of the
queries on the questionnaire to be an outgrowth of an intraoffice dispute between the assistant and her superiors. Even the one excepted
question - dealing with pressure on the assistant district attorneys to
work in political campaigns and for this reason deemed by the Court
to be "of public concern" - was not enough to prevent the assistant
from being sacked for insubordination when Pickering balancing was
applied. All the other questions were found to be private - directly
linked to the office dispute - and thus entitled to no effective protection at all. 92
"Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern," the Court held, "must be determined by the content, form, and
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record."9 3 In
reaching its conclusion in this case, the Court appears to have emphasized the content of the speech by characterizing it as concerned
mostly with "only [mundane] internal office matters"94 and thus to
have held the speech to possess only low-value constitutional status. 95
The Court, however, provided only an amorphous standard for finding counterpart high-value public speech - "whether it relate[s] to
any matter of political, social or other concern to the community." 96
The context of the questionnaire was not specifically identified but
seemed to reflect either the circumstances in which the questionnaire
was circulated, the speaker's motive, or both.9 7 The form, as we shall

see, was somehow associated with the extent of the group to whom
the questionnaire was distributed. 98
In Rankin v. McPherson,9 9 the Court shifted its analysis to the cir-

cumstantial and/or motivational context of the speech. It validated as
public speech the remark of a low-level public employee when she
heard on the radio of the attempted assassination of President Rea91. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
92. Id. at 147-49.
93. Id. at 147-48.
94. Id. at 143.
95. Id. at 147.
96. Id. at 146. See infra note 112 and accompanying text for somewhat more specific examples of public speech.
97. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 153-54.
98. See infra notes 318-20 and accompanying text.

99. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
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gan: "[If they go for him again, I hope they get him."" As the Court
explained, "The statement was made in the course of a conversation
addressing the policies of the President's administration. It came on
the heels of a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of
heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of the
President."'10 1
Here the Court chose to place its entire emphasis on the context of
the remark 0 2 rather than on its meaning and suitability for general
discourse. To the extent that Rankin can be read to hold that a public
employee's remark may be given the protected status of public speech
simply because it is related in any way to a public official and his policies, it stands for nothing but a tautology, because nearly every statement of any public employee of any significance to this inquiry would
be about a public official or public office, usually the very one connected with his employment. 0 3 At any rate the link between the
President's official policies and the motivation behind a blurted wish
for the ultimate success of his would-be assassin seems too attenuated
to give First Amendment protection to such expression. It avoids any
but the most superficial analysis of the speech, a type of analysis that
is in the long run not very protective of speech because it proves too
much - viz., that virtually any statement about a public figure or
policy is protected.
I now spell out some of the principal reasons that determine
whether public employees' speech is constitutionally protected under
the Connick rubric. I revisit most of these in my later criticisms and in
my proposal for pluralistic value convergence.
1. Present Approaches Under the Connick Line of Cases for
Determining Public and Private Speech in the
Public Sector
The Court in Connick, in defining public speech, relied heavily and
directly on the instrumental value of free speech to further citizens'
participation in democratic self-government. 1°4 Some of the problems
and issues associated with the Court's Connick approach are described below.
As already noted, the distinction between speaker qua citizen and
speaker qua public employee is crucial to the judiciary's understand100. Id. at 381.
101. Id. at 386.
102. Cf. id. at 397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that, "[t]he majority's magical transformation of the motive for McPherson's statement into its content is ...
misguided .

. . .")

(emphasis in original).

103. But cf. Smith, supra note 79, at 255 (Rankin extended the public speech doc-

trine beyond a statement about the speaker's own employer).
104. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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ing of public speech." ° Yet, this analytical citizen/employee distinction is sometimes distorted. For example, a governmental employer
may make the error of treating the remarks of its employee as lowvalue private speech simply because that person is in fact a public employee, even when the remarks and the circumstances in which the
words are spoken evince the speaker's role qua citizen and not qua
employee. 1' 6 By the same token, there can be a correlative but opposite tendency, as illustrated in Rankin v. McPherson, to scale back the
speaker's status as an employee dramatically and to cast her in the
role of citizen whenever any tincture of public purpose colors her
speech. This frequent tendency by courts to label speech as public or
private, depending on judicial findings of such minute but seemingly
talismanic aspects related to the speech or speaker, can be associated
with the "fallacy of composition": 10 7 here, treating the distinction between the two types of speech as capable of being unambiguously applied whenever a minor or incidental aspect of "publicness" (or
"public employment" as the case may be) is present.
A closely related problem - one often identical in substance - is
the propensity of courts (and scholars) to place an overemphasis on
the formal organs of government. For example, if Robert Bork's First
Amendment values' 0 8 were applied to identify public speech, the extent of protection would no doubt shrivel because Bork confines the
value of free speech to "governmental behavior, policy, or personnel"'1 9 and insists that speech bear a close, literal relation to this value
to be protected. In contrast, as just noted, the Supreme Court in
Rankin extended protection to speech uttered in the remotest context
of governmental policy or structure." 0 Though Bork's theory and the
Rankin holding yield strikingly dissimilar results, each is premised on
a similar notion that a relation to formal governmental structure may
or should control the level of First Amendment protection for a particular instance of speech.
The Court in Connick, as already noted, held that "[w]hether an
employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed from the whole record."'
The Court has not, however, pro105. See, e.g., supra, note 45 and accompanying text. Cf. Thomas W. Rynard, The
Public Employee and Free Speech in the Supreme Court: Self-Expression, Public Access to Information, and the Efficient Provision of Governmental Services, 21 URB.
LAW. 447, 464 (1989) (noting the two types of relationships).
106. See City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 176 (1976) ("Whatever its duties as an employer, when
the board sits in public meetings to conduct public business ... it may not be required
to discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment .
").
107. See. e.g., IRVING M. CoPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 96-97 (4th ed. 1972).

108.
109.
110.
111.

See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See discussion of Rankin, supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (emphasis added).
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vided much guidance by which to apply these cryptic standards, except
to state that they could apply to the failure of a public agency to "discharge[] its governmental responsibilities" or to the employee's attempt "to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of
public trust""' by or in the agency. One commentator has defined
these elements as follows: "the content factor relates to the subject
matter of the speech, the form factor examines who the speech was
conveyed to [as well as the manner in which it was conveyed], and the
'1 13
context factor encompasses where and why the employee spoke."
These definitions may now be adopted ex hypothesi, but are subject to
further refinement.
"Context" most often refers to the involvement of the speech in an
employee's personal grievance with the employer. If such involvement is found to exist in the most minute degree, its presence may
result in a ruling that the employee's remark is low-value private
speech. This issue is also frequently related to the courts' making the
distinction between speaker as citizen and as public employee too
rigid." 4 Frequently the lower courts identify "context" with the motivation of the speaker." 5
"Form" can involve the seeming paradox, found in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District," 6 that a statement may be
given the protection of public speech even though made to a nongeneral audience, even one person.
"Content" or subject matter has the greatest influence over the classification of the speech but is particularly compelling when the speech
concerns a strong public policy, such as that against racial
discrimination.' '7
2. Non-Connick Approaches to Protection of Public
Employees' Speech
The major First Amendment value of self-expression is rarely used
to classify speech by public employees, 18 and the search for truth or
knowledge (in a theoretic sense unalloyed with political debate) is evidently never so used.
112. Id. at 148.
113. Nadine Renee Dahm, Note, Protecting Public Employees and Defamation Defendants: A Two-Tiered Analysis as to What Constitutes "A Matterof Public Concern,"
23 VAL. U. L. REV. 587, 613-14 (1989) (emphasis added).
114. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
115. See infra note 231-312 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 148 n.8 (1983).
117. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8 (1983).
118. See infra notes 377-81 and accompanying text.
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3. The Lack of Clarity
The upshot of Connick, its sibling McPherson, and their lower-court
progeny is that there exist only vague and unwieldy standards for public speech in the public sector." 9 One commentator, Allred, has attempted to construct an empirical a posterioritypology of the qualities
of public speech found by the lower courts120 but concludes that there

are no consistent standards.1 z2 Dahm finds "an inherently vague standard."' 22 The Connick Court itself holds that " 'it [is n]either appropriate [n]or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against
which all such statements may be judged.' ",123 Indeed, one respected
circuit judge has stated that the public employment cases resist the
application of any uniform rules of decision: "Determinations of public concern [under Connick's prong-one], and the [prong-two] balancare,
ing itself, require ad hoc case-by-case application. The cases
' 24
therefore, not good sources for rules of general application.'
119. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
120. See Allred, supra note 4, at 50-75 ("Speech on Matters of Current Community
Debate", "Speech Alleging Malfeasance or Abuse of Office", "Speech on Public
Safety and Welfare", "Speech on the Quality of Public Education", "Speech Concerning Discrimination", and "Matters of Purely Personal Interest").
121. Allred, supra note 4, at 75.
122. Dahm, supra note 113, at 594 (following Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited:
A New Role for an Old Doctrine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 21 Val. U.
L. Rev. 241, 259 (1987)).
123. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968)).
124. Goffer v. Marbury, 956 F.2d 1045, 1050 (11th Cir. 1992) (Godbold, J.).
The opinion in one lower federal court case, handed down too late to be incorporated into the general analysis of this article, has a sophisticated analysis of the elements involved in the application of Connick's prong-one threshhold test of whether a
public employee's speech is of public concern. In O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905,
913-15 (1st Cir. 1993), the court of appeals - in surveying various lower court applications of the Connick standard - developed a tripartitite framework to understanding the problem:
[1] Some courts have adopted a content-based analysis, focusing exclusively on 'which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to make informed decisions about the operation of their
government' . . . in effect providing per se protection to public-employee
speech on certain topics of 'inherent' public interest, such as official malfeasance or abuse of office.
[2] Other courts have adopted an analysis which turns either entirely or in
part on the employee's subjective intent, i.e., on whether the employee's
speech 'was calculated to disclose misconduct' or to inspire public debate on
some issue of significant interest.
[3] On the other hand, public-employee speech on a topic which would
not necessary qualify, on the basis of its content alone, as a matter of inherent
public concern (e.g., internal working conditions, affecting only the worker
and co-workers), may require a more complete Connick analysis into the
form and context of the public-employee expression... [including, inter alia,
an inquiry into] whether the "form" [or "context"] of the employee's expression suggests a subjective intent to contribute to any such public discourse.
Id. at 913-14 (citations ommitted).
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B. Defamation

At common law defamation was a tort of strict liability, at least insofar as the words spoken or written injured the plaintiff in his reputation.' 25

"Commentators generally agreed . . . that the historic

protection afforded individual reputation by the common-law actions
for libel and slander did not effect an abridgement of the freedom of
[speech or] of the press.' 1 26 Thus the common law of defamation did
not know the distinction between public and private speech; strict liability was the rule whether injured reputation concerned a public or
private matter. Then came a series of cases in the Supreme Court
which placed a constitutional gloss on the common law and opened
the grounds up for the distinction.
1. From Public Official (or Figure) to Public Speech to Public
Figure and Back Again to Public (or Private) Speech
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan127 the Supreme Court - despite
its famous assertion that there is "a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"' 28 - actually held that "a federal [constitutional] rule.., prohibits a public official from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' - that is,
with [subjective] knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.' 29 The reference to "a profound national commitment" to wide-open debate on public issues shows that
the Court bottomed its decision on the instrumental value of free
speech to democracy. 130 In other words, as in Pickering and Connick
and their line of cases, the prevailing First Amendment value has been
the instrumental political value, not constitutive self-expression or a
disinterested search for truth. The emphasis in New York Times,
The court's approach to the interpretation of lower courts' applications of Connick
parallels in many respects the analysis that I offer in this article.
125. See, e.g., E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, 79 L.J.K.B. 198 (1910) ("A man may publish a libel in good faith believing it to be true,

. . .

and reasonably believing it to be

true, but in fact the statement was false. Under these circumstances he has no defence to the action, however excellent his intention.").
126. Willard H. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern
Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 581, 586 (1964). Pedrick points out two com-

mon-law exceptions for speech about public figures: the "fair-comment" rule, which
allowed adverse comments if the facts themselves were accurately reported, and the
rule crafted in Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908), which created a
privilege for false statements about public figures if the statements were made in good
faith. Id. at 583-84.
127. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
128. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 279-80 (emphasis added) (citing Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281
(Kan. 1908)).
130. See also Dworkin, supra note 19, at 58.
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though (as already indicated), was upon the status of the person about
whom the statement was made and upon the state of mind of the
speaker - not upon the nature of the statement itself on the "issues"
(though the subject matter of the lawsuit was clearly of public concern, the civil rights movement in the South). Shortly thereafter the
this protection to public figures, as well as public
Court extended
13
officials. 1
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,132 the plurality, faced with a
situation in which the person allegedly defamed was not "a 'public
official' or a 'public figure' but ... a private individual,"'1 33 acknowledged the nature of the speech itself as a constitutional standard and
found that speech as such is protected by the New York Times standard when its "publication concerns a matter of public or general interest. '134 Justice Marshall warned in dissent, though, against turning
from the status of the figure to the nature of the speech as an organizing principle. He indicated that such a reorientation would threaten
the ability of persons to protect their interests in reputation, "since all
human events are arguably within the area of 'public or general concern' "135 and that injury to all reputations would become judged by
the supposedly more lenient, speech-oriented protective standard.
The Court adopted the Marshall approach in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 3 6 and once again placed the emphasis for determining constitu-

tional protection for the defendant in a defamation suit squarely on
the public or private status of the defamed figure. The Court held that
a private figure as plaintiff - whose interest in reputation would carry
greater weight than a public figure's similar interest when balanced
against the value of protecting the speech - would have to prove
only "fault" (usually negligence) by the defendant, not New York
Times malice, to recover. In so ruling the Court noted "the... difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis
which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and
which do not.... We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to...
judges."' 37 Yet the Gertz Court did not altogether discard a role for
the nature of the speech itself in assessing its degree of constitutional
protection: it held that one measure of whether a figure is public or
private is whether he has "thrust [himself] to the forefront of [a] par131. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
132. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 31.
134. Id. at 44.
135. Id. at 79 (Marshall, J. , dissenting). Justice Marshall appears to have, some
sixteen years after his Rosenbloom dissent, fulfilled his own prophecy by holding that
the respondent's remark in Rankin v. McPherson, though only minimally related to

the President and his policies, was about a matter of public concern. See supra notes
99-103 and accompanying text.
136. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
137. Id. at 346.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol1/iss1/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V1.I1.1

28

Gray: Public and Private Speech: Toward a Practice of Pluralistic Conve

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPEECH

1994]

ticular public controvers[y]"'38 - surely an implicit indication that defamatory speech about a figure involved in and defined by such
controversy would also be speech of a public nature. Nine years later,
the Connick Court, addressing the issue in the public employment sector, shifted its focus again and explicitly forced judges to undertake
the task of directly evaluating whether speech is public or private. Finally, the Court added back the same express requirement in defamation cases as well, coming full circle back to the position which it
claimed to be avoiding in Gertz.
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,139 the

Supreme Court - faced with a private-figure plaintiff not plainly involved with a public issue - reverted to the Rosenbloom public/private speech distinction to resolve the case. In ruling that errant
commercially compiled bankruptcy reports of limited distribution
were private speech, the plurality relied heavily on Connick. "We
have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance. It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is at the
heart of the First Amendment's protection."'"
As we stated in Connick ...this 'special concern' [for speech on
public issues] ... is no mystery... The First Amendment 'was fash-

ioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.' In conof purely private concern is of less First
trast, speech on matters
14
Amendment concern.

The plurality in Greenmoss Builders, following the Connick Court's
lead, thus defined public speech by the instrumental value of self-governance, while assigning to private speech a role defined by the
nonpolitical "individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience. '"142

Although the plurality did not expressly affirm this point in its ruling, the case may also be interpreted as a return to common-law strict
liability when both the plaintiff and the speech are private in nature. 43 Thus "it must be that the Gertz requirement of some kind of
fault ...

is ... inapplicable in cases such as this."'"

The Court, in

138. Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
139. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality opinion).
140. Id. at 758-59 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 759 (brackets in original) (citations ommitted) (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).

142. Id. at 762.
143. See, e.g., Smolla, Emotional Distressand the FirstAmendment. An Analysis of
Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIz. ST. L.J. 423, 471 (1988) ("Under the logic of Dun &
Bradstreet[v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.], the first amendment value of this species of
speech is so low that the unvarnished rules of the common law are sufficient to protect it, and no independent first amendment rules will apply.") (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted).
144. Dun & Bradstreet,supra note 2, 472 U.S. at 774 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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rebuffing Gertz's emphasis on the status of the plaintiff as a sole criterion for protecting otherwise actionable defamatory speech, has now
implanted the teaching of Connick in another area of law. Aside from
creating vagueness in the criterion of constitutional protection for defamatory speech itself, this step has also introduced a logical gap in
the law of defamation.
2.

The Unfinished Logic of the Hepps Schema

In PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc., v. Hepps,145 the Supreme Court
made the following observation about the impact of Greenmoss Builders on defamation and the New York Times line of cases:
One can discern in these decisions two forces that may reshape the
common-law landscape to conform to the First Amendment. The
first is whether the plaintiff is a public official or figure, or is instead
a private figure. The second is whether the speech at issue is of
public concern. When the speech is of public concern and the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, the Constitution clearly requires the plaintiff to surmount a much higher barrier before
recovering damages from a... defendant than is raised by the common law. When the speech is of public concern but the plaintiff is a
private figure, as in Gertz, the Constitution still supplants the standards of the common law, but the constitutional requirements are
... less forbidding than when the plaintiff is a public figure and the
speech is of public concern. When the speech is of exclusively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Dun & Bradstreet, the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any
change in 46at least some of the features of the common-law
landscape.'

In so describing the moments of the intersection of these "two
forces" - (1) the public or private status of the figure or plaintiff and
(2) the public or private nature of the speech - Justice O'Connor,
writing for the Court in Hepps, provided a systematic way for readily
determining a defamation plaintiff's required proof of the defendant's
state of mind. The schema or matrix provided in Figure 1 is my own
interpretation of Justice O'Connor's framework.
The schema reveals that the Hepps observation cannot (or does
not) account for private speech about a public figure. In the logical
progression described by Justice O'Connor, there must be a moment
where a public figure (the plaintiff) and private speech about that figure coincide; but the state-of-mind requirement, unlike the similar requirements for the other three moments, is not revealed. I shall later
use the pluralistic theory of First Amendment value convergence to
fill in this logical (and perhaps doctrinal) gap, as well to make the
concepts of public speech clearer both cognitively and normatively, by
145. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
146. Id. at 775.
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Figure I

examining just such a case where this elliptical moment has actually
appeared.
III. THREE THINKERS WHOSE IDEAS OF THE "PUBLIC"
CORRESPOND TO THE MAIN FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES

A.

The Stages of Inquiry and Their Relation to McKeon's
PluralisticSchema

In the previous two parts of this inquiry I have considered the issues
concerned with distinguishing public and private speech under the
First Amendment from the standpoint of two widely separated, even
extreme perspectives. In Part I, I outlined the major First Amendment values or justifications of democratic self-governance, self-expression or self-realization, and the search for truth; showed their
origins in the ground-breaking work of Justices Brandeis and Holmes
in the first years of this century; and prepared the basis for linking
these three main values to the thought of three figures of philosophical orientation - whose thought I shall soon present in this, Part III
- in order to focus more directly on comprehensive treatments expressly dealing with conceptions of the "public." In Part II, I shifted
my viewpoint to sketch the distinction between public and private
speech and the problems posed in making this distinction in the concrete jurisprudence of First Amendment case law. Now, in Part III, I
move to narrow this gap between broad First Amendment values and
issues in the definite case law by drawing out the thought of these
three figures on their conceptions of the "public" in a way that can be
used in completing the inquiry. In Part IV, I shall attempt to close the
gap between broad formulations of First Amendment values and corresponding conceptions of the "public," on the one hand, and existing
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problems in the concrete jurisprudence, on the other, by showing how
the materials of the former can be used to resolve issues in the latter.
My selection of the thought of John Dewey, Hannah Arendt, and
Walter Lippmann to represent differing viewpoints of the "public" is
partly governed by the substantive relevance of their thought and
partly governed in a purely analytical sense by the comparatively tidy
way in which they combine to form a practice of pluralistic conver147
gence under the metaphilosophical schema of Professor McKeon.
I have already shown at some length how their respective viewpoints

correspond to well-recognized First Amendment values. From the
standpoint of convergence or congruence, the thought of the three fit
into "types" or "modes of thought" laid out in McKeon's
metaphilosophical schema - a form of analysis that claims to account
for all possible "types" of thought in an exhaustive, systematic
fashion.
Even in non-technical considerations of thinking, four modes of
thought may be distinguished: it is a process by which parts are put
together, or englobing truths are approximated, or problems are
solved, or arbitrary formulations are interpreted. The four are formally exhaustive of possibilities: [the logistic mode -] the assumption of least parts, but no whole except by composition; [the
dialectical mode -] the assumption of an ontological unifying principle, but no absolute least parts; [the problematicmode -] the rejection of least parts and separated wholes, and the assumption of
problems and natures encountered in the middle region; and [the
operational mode -] the assumption that all distinctions are initially arbitrary. The four modes of thought
are mutually exclusive
48
and exhaustive of all possible modes.'

My fundamental claim at this point is that, because the respective
positions of the three figures can be related and understood vis-A-vis
three of McKeon's modes of thought, the use of their thought involves
a nearly comprehensive survey of all possible ways of thinking about
147. The schema and its modes of thought is metaphilsosphical in the sense, inter
alia, that McKeon claims value neutrality for it, i.e., that it presents a heuristic device
for relating and understanding substantively different philosophies without distorting
the true meaning of any of them. The use of such a schema represents a genuine
advantage in the problem of relating different world views, "since [otherwise] it is
easy to refute other philosophers within the framework of one's own philosophy [,
and since] it is ...

easy [otherwise] to take ...

the step from the refutation of other

doctrines to the conviction that the definitions and meanings employed in those doctrines are quite without conceivable foundation ...... McKEON, supra note 9 at 17475. My use of such McKeonite terminology as "schema" and "mode(s) of thought"
involves a considerable degree of oversimplification. Readers who desire full amplification should consult, e.g., the essays of McKeon collected and reprinted in RICHARD
McKEON, FREEDOM AND HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THOUGHT OF RICHARD McKEON (Zahava K. McKeon ed., 1990). On the problems of
interpreting McKeon generally, See, e.g., GEORGE PLOCHMAN, RICHARD McKEON: A
STUDY (1990).

148.

McKEON,

supra note 8, at 245 (all emphases added).
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the concept of the "public." The claim, however, cannot be formally
fulfilled or completed, because I have no figure whose thought I
choose to consider in connection with a fourth or logistic mode,
although I have suggested that in some respects Robert Bork might be
such a figure.1 49 Nonetheless, the use of these three figures should be
precise enough for my purpose, "because the end aimed at is not
knowledge but action."' ° This Aristotelian distinction between
knowledge and action - or stated in other terms, between theory and
practice - is indeed quite fundamental to my inquiry.
The fact that I locate my inquiry on the practical side of the distinction means, as I just suggested, that it should be sufficient for me to
sketch my pluralistic resolution of the problem of defining public
speech "roughly and in outline,' ' 15' rather than with exact precision.
Moreover, my inquiry is practical because, although I do set out broad
norms of First Amendment jurisprudence, I ultimately (in Part IV)
attempt to relate and apply these norms to the "particulars, i.e.... the
circumstances of the action [here, the adjudication of relevant First
Amendment cases] and with the objects [e.g., the specific facts of
these cases] with which [the action] is concerned.' 1 52 Thus I "recognize the particulars ... and practice is concerned with particulars."' 53

As McKeon himself has said, in the context of his own efforts to invent a pluralistic schema of values to ameliorate international conflict:
The problem of establishing a program of common action based on
the different philosophic views, religious beliefs, and political systems represented... was a practicalexercise in exploring the conse-

quences of different conceptions of human rights, democracy,
freedom,15 4law, and justice on the co-operation and antagonism of
nations.

On a much smaller scale I seek to use McKeon's approach to resolve tensions in First Amendment jurisprudence by formulating common solutions from differing prescriptive viewpoints on the "public."
These common solutions might then become at least beginning points
to resolve those tensions (including but not limited to those identified
in detail in this article) in constitutional litigation.
149. See supra, notes 53-54 and accompanying text; see also infra, notes 216-17 and
accompanying text for a discussion that attempts to show further why Bork's position
should not be acceptable as a fourth viewpoint in my pluralistic approach to distinguishing public and private speech.
150. Aristotle, Ethics, reprinted in RICHARD McKEON, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 937 (1968).
151. Id. at 936.
152. Id. at 966.
153. Id. at 1028. See also Aristotle, Politics, reprinted in RICHARD McKEON, THE
BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1164 (1968) ("[E]nactments [of laws] must be universal,
but actions are concerned with particulars.").

154. RICHARD McKEON, DEMOCRACY IN A WORLD OF TENSIONS:
PREPARED BY UNESCO v (1951) (emphases added).
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One word of caution, however, is needed at this point: In using McKeon's schema with its modes of thought, one must beware of the
fallacy of entitization (sometimes known as reification) or the fallacy
of "misplaced concreteness. 1' 55 The modes of thought are purely formal (in the modern sense 56) and represent only explanatory categories that can be used (as McKeon claims) to relate different
philosophical views to one another neutrally without producing the
distortion that occurs when one philosophy is viewed through the lens
of another. As such, each mode of thought represents a "type," into
which various philosophies of differing substantive content can be fitted for understanding them, neutrally and without distortion, vis-a-vis
other philosophies assigned to other modes of thought. The moment,
though, that one mistakes a mode of thought, as a heuristic "type," for
a philosophy with substantive content, one has fallaciously entitized or
reified that mode of thought. Accordingly, as I explore the substance
of Dewey's, Arendt's, and Lippmann's thought on the "public," it is
important to remember that (1) all references to McKeon's schema of
modes of thought are essentially heuristic in nature, and (2) that - in
principle - other philosophers or figures of substantive views differing from the views of these three on the "public" might well have been
selected and understood through these same heuristic categories.
Thus my selection of Dewey, Arendt, and Lippmann to represent
views of the "public" does not, by any means, foreclose the utilization
of other figures for this purpose.. On the other hand, because of their
cogent and systematic accounts of establishing and valuing the "public," and their ready adaptation to McKeon's schema, they seem ideally suited for the treatment that follows.
B. John Dewey and The Public and Its Problems
Dewey's conception of the "public" falls under McKeon's problematic mode of thought.
"Problematic".

.

. methods of inquiry define terms relative to the

problems under consideration and to the circumstances by which
the problems are determined. They avoid alike the dialectical as-

sumption that science is concerned with an organically interrelated
universe in which the effect of each part on all others must be taken
into account in each inquiry and the logistic assumption that science
is concerned with a model or a construct in which effects 57are explained by the operations and interrelations of least parts.'
Accordingly, Dewey's conception of the public "has a political and
social... context" and is "limited to human action in [such] a context
[with] ... circumstances which afford protection to the action of the
155. See ALFRED

NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY

D. Sherbourne, eds. 1978).

7, 18 (D. Griffin &

156. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
157. McKEON, supra note 9, at 168.
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individual."15 The problem of the public is to differentiate it "from
the numerous other groups of men in association."' 59 "The question
'of what transactions should be left as far as possible to voluntary initiative and agreement and what should come under the regulation of
the public is a question of... concrete conditions that can be known
only by careful observation,' 160 not by general principles derived
from abstract reasoning. Founded on these premises, the following
elements pertinent to my inquiry are found in Dewey's thought.
Dewey is a pragmatist concerned with self-governance. Ideas are
united with action and are derived a posteriori from the "facts of
human activity,"' 6 ' not from pure or disinterested truth. In this respect Dewey is like J. S. Mill, whose truth is tempered by social utility,' 62 and - as I argued in Part I - like Justice Holmes, whose
"marketplace of ideas" is a pragmatic test of truth based on its political acceptance.63
[The consequences of human acts upon others] are of two kinds,
those which affect the persons directly engaged in a transaction, and
those which affect others beyond those immediately concerned. In

this distinction we find the germ of the distinction between the private and the public. When indirectconsequences are recognized and
there is an effort to regulate them, something [i.e., a public] having
the traits of a state comes into existence. When the consequences of

an action are confined.., mainly to64the persons directly engaged in
it, the transaction is a private one.'
Thus Dewey's distinction corresponds to the Court's own contrast between public speech as speech that "embrace[s] all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period,"' 165
and private speech
1' 66
as speech about "intimate human relationships.'
The public, however, is not to be identified with the state itself.
Rather, the state and its officials are the public's agents. Indeed, an
inchoate
public may have to break existing political structures to form
167
itself.

158. Id., at 221 (emphasis added to distinguish action from knowledge).

159. Id. at 233.
Id. (quoting DEWEY, supra note 12, at 193).
DEWEY, supra note 12, at 9.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35-36, 70-73 and accompanying text.
164. DEWEY, supra note 12, at 12-13 (emphasis added). Cf. Wright, supra note 6, at
156 (Under Mills, speech is "social" and "must carry implications beyond the
speaker's individual and immediate consequences.").
165. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
166. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984).
167. DEWEY, supra note 12, at 15, 31, 67.
160.
161.
162.
163.
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Speech of concern to the public is objective in nature and does not
strictly depend on the subjective motive of the speaker. 168 The rule of
law canalizes actions and makes them predictable to all members of
the public; it does not simply issue commands. 169 Liberty becomes
rule by officials of the public - rule that "enables individual members
to count with reasonable certainty upon what others will do . . .
facilitat[ing] helpful cooperation. 1 70 This view of law and liberty coincides with McKeon's observation that, within the "problematic"
mode of thought, the "public" is formed by the deliberate choice of
71
men "according to prudence, or right reason, or the rule of law.'
The problem of the public is to transform "its inchoate and amorphous [condition by] . . . organiz[ing it for] effective political action
relevant to present social needs and opportunities.' 17 Various diversions and amusements distract the public from finding the shared experiences 173 needed to form itself effectively.' 74 Thus so-called
"news" may be of only trivial and sensationalquality, having no coherence or explanatory power to bring to the relevant problems of the
public.' 75 The Supreme Court, from its judicial
perspective, has im176
plicitly agreed with this view on occasion.
Creative expression through the use of symbols 7 7 and other forms
of artistic expression is essential to the formation of the public. "The
function of art has always been to break78 through the crust of conventionalized and routine consciousness.'
C. Hannah Arendt and The Human Condition (Especially the
Chapter Entitled "The Public and the Private Realm")
Arendt's conception of the "public" falls under McKeon's operational mode of thought. Knowledge as embodied in the force of
words serves as the power through which a public is realized; 79 but
168. Cf. id. at 12 ("We take then our point of departure from the objective fact that

human acts have consequences upon others.") (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 54.

170. Id. at 71-72; see also id. at 150 ("Liberty is that secure release and fulfillment
of personal potentialities which take place only in . . . manifold association with
others.").
171. McKEON, supra note 8, at 249.
172. DEWEY, supra note 12, at 125.
173. Id. at 142.
174. Id. at 138-39.
175. Id. at 179-80.
176. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, Inc., 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (distinguishing "public
controversy" from all controversies of concern to the public, in ruling that
"[d]issolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of 'public
controversy' referred to in Gertz, even though the marital difficulties of extremely

wealthy individuals may be of [sensational] interest to some portion of the reading
public").
177. DEWEY, supra note 12, at 142.
178. Id. at 183.
179. Cf. McKEON, supra note 8, at 248.
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the power is achieved not through domination of the weaker by the
stronger members of the community, but as concerted action through
words and deeds to achieve the authentically human. The operational
method follows the maxim of Protagoras that "man is the measure of
all things '' 180 - or in Kantian terms, the perspective of a Copernican
revolution in which "objects must conform to our knowledge," '' and
not our knowledge, to objects. The speaker appeals through speech to
the reality constructed in the mental faculties of the audience, 8 2 not
through proof of eternal ideas, external things, or objective natures.
"[T]ruth is discovered only in the free clash of opinions, and ... plau-

sible arguments can be found to support the contradictory of any
proposition or doctrine ....
83 The operational method is the
method of debate, and thus the method of lawyers, like Justice Louis
Brandeis, with whom I have closely compared Arendt.
Arendt is an existentialist, a student of Martin Heidegger and Karl
Jaspers, and is concerned with self-expression - especially as it occurs within politics as she constitutively understands it. For her, "reality depends utterly upon appearance and therefore upon the existence
of a public realm into which things can appear out of the darkness of
sheltered [private] existence.' s4 Appearance, whether of speech or
action, is of the new, the spontaneous, of that which constitutes a "beginning.' 8 5 The source of much of her thought is the ancient Athenians' concepts of public life, the very same as Justice Brandeis' source
in his dissenting opinion in Whitney v. California. s6 Accordingly, as I
argued in Part I, there is a significant correspondence between the
thought of Arendt the philosopher and Brandeis the jurist.
"Although the distinction between private and public coincides with
the opposition of necessity and freedom ...

[t]he most elementary

meaning of the two realms indicates that there are things that need to
be hidden and others that need to be displayed publicly if they are to
exist at all."'18 7 The hidden realm of the private concerns biological
necessities - chiefly the drive to procreate (and other needs satisfied
180. Plato, Cratylus, reprinted in THE

COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO

421, 424

(Edith Hamilton et al. eds. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1961).
181. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 22 (Norman K. Smith trans.,
1929).
182. Cf. McKEON, supra note 8, at 250 ("[I1n the operational method the knower
makes knowledge.") (emphasis added).
183. Richard McKeon, Dialogue and Controversy in Philosophy, 17 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 143 (1956), reprinted in RICHARD McKEON, FREEDOM AND
HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THOUGHT OF RICHARD

McKEON 104 (Zahava K. McKeon, ed., 1990).
184. ARENDT, supra note 13, at 51 (emphasis added). See also id. at 57 ("[Pjrivacy
...can never replace the reality rising out of the sum total of aspects presented by
one object to a multitude of spectators.") (emphasis added).
185. Cf. id. at 177-78.
186. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
187. ARENDT, supra note 13, at 73 (emphasis added).
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within the intimate relations of the family) and the innate urge to survive by constantly appropriating the raw materials of nature. 18 8 Because these necessities are essential to life itself, the private realm
which nutures their satisfaction cannot be dispensed with. "A life
spent entirely in public, in the presence of others, becomes ...

shal-

low. While it retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight
from some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose
its depth in a very real, non-subjective sense. "189
The term "public" points to both a symbolic and a literal "space" in
which the most authentic human experience - the sharing of words
and deeds - is expressed and developed within "the world common
to us all."' 9° The function of speech within this common world of appearance is to illumine "the fact of [human] distinct[ive]ness" and thus
to "actualiz[e] ...the human condition of plurality"' 9' and individual
uniqueness, not to state objective facts or natures except the fact that
genuine equals must have the power to speak in a common, public
world.
Thus "operational" speech of concern to the public, like "problematic" speech (but in a different way because its meaning reflects subjective rather than objective reality), does not turn on whether the
speaker's meaning or motive is subjective. A subjective or personal
motive for the speech and its fitness for display to the public are simply two aspects of the same phenomenon: its authenticity as an expression of individual human uniqueness. In a literal but nonetheless
very true sense all public speech is subjective (though not all subjective speech is public), because there is simply no other way for public
speech to exist consistently with the existential belief in freedom as
authentic self-expression. This view corresponds to the McKeonite assertion that under the operational mode of thought "freedom is spontaneous or undetermined activity . . . ; animate beings are free.

Human freedom is an instance of the freedom to originate: it is freedom of self-initiation or self-expression as opposed to conformity to
the customary in action, opinion, or taste.' 92
The problem of the public is in many respects to rid its space of the
display of the banal - not so much of the commonplace, but rather of
the mindlessness and "sheer thoughtlessness" which "becloud19 3the reality" of words and deeds which appear in the public realm.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Cf id. at 96-101.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 178.

supra note 8, at 247-48,(last emphasis added).
ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALEVIL 287-88 (revised Penguin ed. 1984). Thus Arendt's concept of the banal
McKEON,

193. Cf. HANNAH
ITY OF

appears to differ from Heidegger's concept of the "everyday" and its culmination in
"publicness," which - through its "averageness and levelling down - obscures" authentic existence. M. HEIDEGGER,-BEING AND TIME 164-65 (Macquarrie & Robinson
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The works of the poet, writer, artist, and monument builder are all
needed to supply permanent points of reference in a world in which
human action and speech are the most fragile of all human prodUCtS. 19 4 Thus, while Arendt's emphasis is on political self-expression,
she does value other forms of expression.
D. Walter Lippmann and The Public Philosophy
Lippmann's conception of the "public" falls under the dialectical
mode of thought. Systems of thought of this "type" collapse phenomenal or empirical distinctions between seemingly contradictory beliefs
to reach overarching, transcendent principles of truth.195 Human reason operating in this transcendent capacity thus supplies the principles
for constituting the public, and dialectic overcomes even the supposed
gap between heavenly truth and worldly justice - and between theory and practice - by fusing them, at least approximately, into an
identity. 196 In rejecting an empirical or phenomenal ground for public
affairs in favor of the transcendent, Lippmann with his emphasis on
the search for theoretic truth - albeit a theoretic truth with practical
repercussions - has not been part of the mainstream of American
thought or First Amendment jurisprudence. 97 Yet despite this divergence from the mainstream of American thought, Lippmann has been
immensely influential with a sophisticated audience, including some
high government officials in several presidential administrations.' 98
Lippmann, though by vocation a journalist, is (for my purposes
here) an ontologist interested in transcendent truth. Genuine knowledge lies in a "world behind the world" that is inaccessible to the
broad and unsophisticated populace. "The concepts and the principles of the [legitimate] public philosophy have their being in the realm
of immaterial entities." 99 Yet "most men - not all men, to be sure,
but most active and influential men - are in practice positivists who
hold that the only world which has reality is the physical world." 2
Matters of public concern, including public speech, are those which
should be guided by reason capable of apprehending the transcendent
norms, but matters of the public are all too often guided by passion.2 ° '
trans., 1962). Yet the difference may be superficial: Heidegger's concept of "publicness" resembles Arendt's concept of "society," "where private interests [primarily
economic ones] assume [unmerited] public significance." ARENDT, supra note 13, at
35.
194. ARENDT, supra note 13, at 173.
195. Cf. McKEON, supra note 9, at 192-93.
196. Cf id. at 203-04.
197. See supra notes 14, 74-76 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., R. STEEL, WALTER LIPPMANN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY, ch. 15
(1980).
199. LPPMANN, supra note 14, at 162.
200. Id. at 163.
201. Cf. id. at 42.
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Modern governance has stood this essential order of things on its
head: it has become "the rule that ideas and principles are private....
All that has to do with what man is and should be ...[has become]
20 2
private and subjective and ... unaccountable.

The problem of the public is to set rational inquiry into genuine
values "above the infinite number of contradictory and competing private [interests guided only by passion]. '2 3 Therefore only intelligent
or wise men2 should be entrusted with the guidance of public affairs,
and public discussion should be conducted rationally to avoid "silliness, baseness, deception,"
and "frivolity" which "incite the passions
20 5
... of

the people.

In true dialectical fashion Lippmann sees no ultimate distinction between his reliance on transcendent truth and his quest for immanent
action. "[T]he discovery of truth, the construction of arguments, and
the clarification of minds [are inseparable and] proceed pace by
pace."20 6 From this perspective Lippmann has declared:
The hallmark of responsible comment is not to sit in judgment on
events as an idle spectator but to enter imaginatively into the role of
a participant in the action. Responsibility consists in sharing the
burden of men directing what is to be done, or the burden of offering some other course of action in the20mood
of one who has realized
7
what it would mean to undertake it.
In thus straddling the boundary between the heaven of ideas and the
world of action, Lippmann presents a vision of the search for truth
that is both like and unlike Holmes' "free trade in ideas": like the
Holmesian view because of its orientation to political action; unlike
Holmes' notion of truth because it turns to a source for that truth
lying beyond the conflicting and self-interested opinions of men in the
world.
My figures -

Dewey, Lippmann, and Arendt -

thus speak with

different voices. Their views of the "public" are, of course, deeply
prescriptive and not merely descriptive; the view of each is aimed at
transforming the materials of society as they exist into a more nearly
formed, adequately functioning "public."20 8 The jurisprudence of the
202. Id. at 99.
203. Id. at 180.
204. McKEON, supra note 8, at 248 (emphasis added).
205. LIPPMANN, supra note 14, at 126.
206. McKEON, supra note 9, at 104.
207. STEEL, supra note 198, at xvii (citations omitted).
208. Cf. Robert Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 601, 669-74 (1990). Professor Post argues that much of the confusion about the
judicial treatment of public speech lies in the courts' failure, through their ambiguous
analysis of that concept, to distinguish between normative (or prescriptive) and descriptive (or empirical) definitions of public speech in their opinions. Yet, he reasons,
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First Amendment presents a definite field of potential action whereby
these differing views -

according to the rule of law -

could be prac-

tically implemented and accordingly "be of use." The means by which
these thinkers' views and First Amendment jurisprudence might converge toward some common ground for understanding and clarifying
the use of speech in a public sense is essentially the, subject of the
fourth and final part of this inquiry.
IV.
A.

APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF PLURALISTIC
CONVERGENCE TO THE CASE LAW

The Meaning of "Convergence" Among a Plurality of Values

Before proceeding further I must refine the meaning of "convergence" when that concept incorporates a plurality of values and then
is applied to the specific case law.
1. Openness to Pluralistic Convergence
At a very minimum the bare concept of pluralistic convergence
must involve the coexistence or coincidence of values that are not incompatible with one another. I have tried to show at critical points in
this inquiry that the main justifications for protection of speech under
the First Amendment are consistent with one another, even though
they do not merge into an identity. They are consistent with one another both philosophically and from the standpoint of their mutual
acceptance under judicial authority. For example, while the Supreme
resolution of the ambiguity by distinguishing between prescriptive norms for identifying discourse worthy of public discussion, and empirical facts describing such discourse by what excites the people's attention, brings its own analytical and doctrinal
problems. On the one hand, "[t]he normative conception of public concern, insofar as
it is used to exclude speech from public discourse, is ... incompatible with the very
democratic self-goverance it seeks to facilitate," id. at 670, because it cuts off from
open discussion ideas that may properly belong to public consideration and thus
smacks of judicial censorship. On the other hand, a descriptive approach that measures public speech simply by whatever stimuli excite the people's interest founders
because of its "lack of any principled method of determining what kinds of issues
ought to be excluded from the domain of public discourse." Id. at 673.
I believe that my inquiry offers a way past each of these two impasses associated
with prescription and description, respectively. It offers a way around the prescriptive
problem of strait-jacketing democratic discussion into one court-approved brand of
public speech by providing a plurality of normative definitions - definitions that are
themselves only examples of "types" of views of the public, incorporated into a mutually exhaustive and inclusive schema. It also offers a way around Post's descriptive
impasse by recognizing that behind the empirical "facts" selected to determine the
scope of a matter of public concern lie normative presuppositions responsible for the
selection of those particular facts and excluding others. Thus all conceptions of public
speech are normative and must exclude some facts. My pluralistic approach expressly
recognizes that the various conceptions of public speech are all normative, but attempts to provide a means - through McKeon's schema - by which each conception can be understood on its own terms without the distortion imposed by other
viewpoints.
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Court has frequently stated that the instrumental value of self-governance enjoys paramountcy as the most significant justification for the
constitutional protection of speech, the Court has not ruled out the
coexistence of other official justifications with this one.2 °9 In the most
pragmatic sense Justice Holmes' and Justice Brandeis' views on the
instrumental value of speech to self-governance and its constitutive
value to self-expression through the exercise of civic virtue in politics,
respectively, are obviously not incompatible, because the two justices
joined each other's path-breaking dissents including the dissent in
Whitney v. California.210 The search for truth through "free trade in
ideas" has also been shown to be concerned with the value of selfgovernance.2 1 The consequence is that the Supreme Court would not
be barred by its own precedents and traditions from adopting a concept of pluralism based on these essential free-speech values. In fact it
implicitly already has.
The conceptions of the "public" corresponding to these essential
free-speech values, as developed by the three thinkers Dewey, Arendt, and Lippmann, are also all compatible - now in a philosophical
rather than a strictly judicial denotation. This assertion is truly the
underlying presupposition of this entire inquiry, and so its acceptance
must probably rest ultimately on intuitive grounds. I should note,
however, that my descriptions of these figures' views on the "public"
and how they may be related to one another vis-a-vis McKeon's
schema are offered throughout as indirect support for this
presupposition.
The plain upshot is that pluralistic convergence remains an open
possibility on both judicial and philosophical grounds, taken as accepted my analysis so far. The argument that follows strives to convert that possibility into a convincing reality.
2.

Rejection of Bork's Exclusivity of the Political

One matter is evident: any First Amendment spokesman who zealously insists that his position on values is totally exclusive from and
against all other positions, must be denied recognition in a pluralistic
scheme. Denial is appropriate whether the exclusivity has either a
purported judicial basis in constitutional doctrine and interpretation,
or a more theoretical ground in the impossibility of accepting and tolerating other constitutional views.
Robert Bork's position, for example - of the total exclusivity of
the narrowly political - has never been adopted by the Supreme
Court. Indeed, it has been decisively rejected both politically 212 and
209. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
210. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
211. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
212. See generally The Biden Report and Report of the Public Citizen Litigation
Group, reprinted in 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 219 (1987); see also generally Nomination of
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judicially.213 Despite his later apparent recantation, on pragmatic
grounds, of exclusive reliance on the political value for free-speech
protection, 14 Bork also continues to belie his reliance on a rigid, doctrinal approach by his insistence on the impossibility of compromise
on First Amendment values. He argues that "moral philosophy has

never succeeded in providing an overarchingsystem that commands
general assent. ' 21 5 From this rejection of any single moral or legal
concept broad enough to support an array of free-speech values, Bork
arrives at his limited scope for deriving such values from the literalness of univocal terms traceable to the history of constitution making.
My approach to valuing speech, however, undercuts Bork's basic
premise by seeking support for broad free-speech protection not in a
single "overarching system that commands general assent" but rather
in a pluralistic view of values that seeks a "common understanding [by
which] doctrinal differences are [seen as] merely different modes of
stating mutually consistent positions. 2 1 6 My viewpoint indeed excludes any position - not just Bork's - that has as its premise that

any single value supports freedom of speech to the total or substantial
exclusion of others.21 7 For example, to the extent that Redish or Perry
stake out an englobing value for self expression, my pluralistic viewpoint also undercuts their positions.
3. Disclosure of Convergence in the Particular Cases
Convergence, as I have already argued, takes on a practical, rather
than a theoretical coloration in the context of agreement on action i.e., in adjudication in particularconcrete cases218 -

and not on ab-

stract doctrine.21 9 Support found within those First Amendment val-

Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
213. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam), overruling the Court's opinion by Sanford, J., in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
- the position of minimal protection of speech adopted by Bork, supra note 45, at 23.
214. Bork, supra note 45, at 333. Nonetheless, Bork defends his 1971 "Neutral
Principles" article as "one of the most discussed and cited law review articles in our
history ....
I remain glad that I wrote it. Most of it still seems to me to be entirely
correct." Id. at 347.
215. Id. at 253 (emphasis added). See also Cass Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 555, 560 (1989) (considering the necessity to develop a "more
concise and unitary test" of high First Amendment value) (emphasis added).
216. McKEON, supra note 8, at 166-67. See also supra notes 9-10.
217. Removal of Bork's position from consideration also addresses the problem of
my failure to complete the McKeonite schema with a figure's thought illustrative of
the logistic mode of thought. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. While
my rejection of Bork to fill this heuristic role does not, of course, eliminate the possibility that some figure's thought might satisfactorily come within the logistic mode of
thought, his treatment here does have the very pragmatic effect of removing his kind
of First Amendment thinking from having any further impact on my argument for
pluralistic convergence.
218. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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ues that allow judicial recognition of a variety of such values, and
which correspond to my figures' equivalent thought, should be enough
to identify a particular instance of speech as public and to validate it
as worthy of heightened First Amendment protection. Indeed, given
the critical role played by McKeon's schema and its concomitant presupposition of value pluralism, support found for a particular instance
of speech in any of the main First Amendment values and its corresponding conception of the "public" will mean that this instance of
speech may be expected to enjoy the accompanying support of other
justifications and corresponding meanings of the "public" as well.
Contradictions and ambiguities in the case law can then be reformulated to reflect mutually consistent meanings of free-speech values
commonly reflected in single instances of speech or action in the concrete world. McKeon's emphasis on practical rather than doctrinal
convergence means that the search is for agreement among divergent
positions on a particulartreatment of public and private speech. So
long as the methods available from his framework as embodied in our
three figures can -

consistently with one another -

account for that

particular treatment, there is no need to merge the value positions
represented by these methods into a single, exclusively controlling rationale for identifying and protecting public speech. A need for exclusive one-to-one correspondence between some overarching doctrine
and each particular instance of public speech is discarded. Convergence among the various rationalesfor public speech is found in the
particular cases, not in the justifications or rationalesthemselves, which
still remain distinct and formally exhaustive in their general and abstract analyticalformulation.
Once again, I refer for edification to McKeon's attempt to apply his
pluralistic schema to the field of international conflict resolution. My
purpose is to approximate that approach and to apply it by analogy to
the field of inquiry here.
All practical problems which depend for their resolution on the
agreement of groups of men who differ in . . . conviction are in-

volved in "ideological conflicts." Terms must be clarified and significances explored in agreement on and in execution of a common
course of action.... A common course of action may be undertaken
and justified for different reasons based on different basic principles ....

The basic problem in [an] ideological conflict concerning

[the meaning of a critical term or conception] is the problem of the
nature of the conflict: [1] whether it can be resolved only by agreement on a single definition and by abandonment of other meanings
which are currently attached to the term or [2] whether it can be
resolved by removal of ambiguities in most or all definitions of [the
term in question] and by discovery of the manner in which they are
compatible with each other in the practical sense of permitting co-
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operative action
without violence to [the term in its] different
22
acceptations. 0
Now I shall apply this general concept of convergence in practice approximating the second branch of McKeon's exposition above (and
the branch that he himself proposes to break impasses in ideological
conflicts) - to some of the issues in particular cases.
B. Public Employment
1. Overemphasis on Formal Organs of Government
There is a tendency to overemphasize the link between the formal
organs of government and the public employee's speech, no matter
how attenuated that link is. As I have already noted, the Supreme
Court, in Rankin v. McPherson,221 did expand the concept of public
speech - rooted in a mere reference to a government official or body
- beyond a statement about the speaker's own public employer.222
Our three figures agree that this type of expansion, even where the
reference is to a public official or entity not the speaker's own employer, constitutes a strained notion of the public relevance of speech.
According to Dewey an inchoate public might need to form itself for
appropriate political action in ways not consistent with the governmental status quo. 223 So according to his thought many statements
could be genuinely public yet not about formal governmental structure at all. Moreover, the comment in Rankin lacked any essential
relation to governmental affairs; 224 and the use of such an incidental
and attenuated relation to governmental affairs would, in Dewey's
eyes, contribute to a misperception of the true nature of the public, to
whom such stray remarks of little rational content have no relevance.
Simple association of such remarks with governmental organs would
also violate Arendt's norm that authentic human existence concerns
the creation by individuals of spontaneous new beginnings. 225 Blurted
statements like that of Ms. McPherson, however, reflect a reactive necessity more than genuine freedom of expression, as well as a tendency toward "mindlessness" in bureaucracy - hardly part of
Arendt's concept of the public. 226 Lippmann would simply object that
220. McKEON, supra note 36, at 194.
221. 483 U.S. 378. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
222. Smith, supra note 79, at 255. See generally supra note 103 and accompanying
text.
223. See supra notes 167 & 172 and accompanying text. Cf. Pedrick, supra note 126,
at 593 ("[T]hose matters which are of public concern also go beyond the immediate
province of government. [For example], [a] threatened labor strike affecting a critical
industry may not provide any immediately discernible role for [uninformed] public
opinion but who would doubt the legitimacy of the public concern and the strategic
significance of the [informed] public attitude.").
224. See, e.g., supra note 110 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 185, 192 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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Ms. McPherson's expression was the result of passion or emotion and
reflects no attempt to enter into rational discussion. 27 All of this is
not to say that public speech might not be associated with formal governmental functions and offices, but rather that mere linkage simpliciter should be approached with skepticism. 2z
2.

Connick's Political Focus on Content, Form, and Context

As I have previously noted, the Court in Connick took an instrumental, political approach to the valuation of public speech2 29 and,
using this approach, focused on the factors of content, form, and context in the speech at issue.2 3 ° I begin with context.
"Context" and the Problem of Private Motivation
The Supreme Court in Connick was worried that every personal
grievance between public employees and the public officials employing them could produce speech worthy of constitutional protection. 3 '
"Context," as a reflection of a disgruntled employee's personal dispute with management, thus has become - in the lower courts - a
primary filter denying protection to speech involved with intraoffice
disputes.23 2
a.

(1) The "Tainted" Approach
I have already discussed the problem of the courts' too directly and
rigidly linking the nature of speech with the mere fact that the speaker
is an employee, without taking account of the fact that he may also
speak as a citizen.2 33 A very closely related problem is the lower
courts' use of the "taint" - my term throughout - of personal motive, when it is "found" (in whatever degree) in the speech of a public
employee, to withdraw the heightened constitutional protection associated with public speech and thus subject the speaker to discharge or
other discipline. The speech, however, may have content worthy of
public attention as understood by our figures, notwithstanding the
motivation of the speaker.234
The cryptic nature and lack of clarity in the Court's own standards
and examples of public speech, 235 and even apparent disclaimer2 36 of
227. Cf. supra note 201 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 106, 107, 110 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 106-07, 110 and accompanying text.
* 234. Cf. Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 F.2d 1298, 1301 (7th Cir. 1990) (importance
of issues to the public may outweigh employee's personal interest in making them).
235. The Court does not provide much guidance by which to apply its cryptic standard of "context," except to state that it generally could apply to disclosure by a public employee of the failure of a public agency to "discharg[e] its governmental
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any controlling definition, gives context (construed as the speaker's
motivation) an extremely broad and potentially self-contradictory
field within which the lower federal courts may reach their holdings in
the cases. Consider, for example, two cases from the Seventh Circuit,
in which the same judge wrote for the court, whose contents were acknowledged by the court to be of public concern, but whose outcomes
differed because of conflicting treatments of motivation.
In Callaway v. Hafeman23 7 the plaintiff, a female school administrator, had "privately," i.e., confidentially, made complaints to the school
superintendent about the sexually harassing deportment of her immediate (male) supervisor; afterwards she was shunted to a lesser post
under a school reorganization plan, which was implemented by the
same male supervisor against whom she had complained. Although
she had been "openly and publicly critical of the reorganization
' her only charge in the ensuing
plan,"238
litigation was that the reorganization plan had been used to "retaliate[ ] against [her] for making
private complaints of sexual harassment. ' 239 The court found that the
employee's complaints of harassment - because she made them in a
"private" context and thus, the court found, in her own private interest - poisoned her constitutional right to criticize the reorganization
plan:
Hence, while it is undoubtedly true that incidences of sexual harassment in a public school.., are inherently matters of public concern,
the Connick test requires us to look at the point of the speech in

question: was it the employee's point to bring wrongdoing to light?
...Or

was the point to further some purely private interest? 2

responsibilities" or to the employee's attempt "to [bring to] light actual or potential
wrongdoing or breach of public trust" by or in the agency. Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
236. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
237. 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987) (Bauer, C.J.).
238. Id. at 415.
239. Id. at 416 (emphasis added). Although citing Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) in its opinion, the court did not come to grips
with the fact that Givhan justifies "private" disclosure of public concerns when a content of special public importance is involved. The issue in Callaway, sexual harassment, like the issue in Givhan, racial discrimination, has similar high public
importance (and as in Givhan, the employee in Callaway made her remarks to a superior responsible for school administration). See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986) (workplace sexual harassment claims are brought under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.).
240. Callaway, 832 F.2d at 417 (emphasis in original) (quoting from Linhart v.
Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985)). Accord, Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass
Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1257 (7th Cir. 1985) (treating some statements, under the
initial Connick prong, as "go[ing] well beyond [the employee's] interest, as a citizen,
in commenting on matters of public concern," despite the similarity of those statements to other statements found to be of public concern). See also Colburn v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 973 F.2d 581, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1992) (following Callaway by
stating that "context" involves the motivation or "point" of the speech in question,
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The court's use of the word "point" indicates that the employee's subjective motive was the controlling issue.24 '

Yet in Berg v. Hunter 42 the court found that another public school
reorganization plan was the setting for speech that it found this time
to be public, 43 although the employee's "speech [did] not implicate
broader issues of public school administration unrelated to his personal disputes[,] [and] the timing and content of these charges [against
the plan] [were] tied inexorably to matters of only personal interest to
[him]."' " Motivation of the employees in each of these cases was regarded as private (in the sense that the speech pertained to the personal interest of each), although each spoke about a public subject
identified as such in the Connick opinion. But no principle in the
cases can account for the different results. Neither can my figures account for the different outcomes, but their thought can be used to
fashion a common solution to avoid such inconsistency.
For Dewey the subjective motivation of speech is immaterial for its
classification as public or private. 24 5' "[T]he line between private and
public is to be drawn on the basis of the extent and scope of the [objective] consequences of acts which are so important as to need control [-1 indirect consequences of transactions [with] such an extent
that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically
cared for."2 46 Private speech, in contrast, concerns actions whose ef-

fects are limited mainly to the persons directly engaged in them.247
Under this standard the public employee's criticisms of the reorgani-

but also stating that motivation, while relevant, is "not dispositive of... First Amendment claims").
241. The term "point" has been used to indicate subjective purpose in both cases
finding an employee's speech to be public, and in cases finding it to be private. Compare, e.g., Roth v. Veteran's Admin., 856 F.2d 1401, 1403-06 (9th Cir. 1988) ("point"
of the employee's speech, his "express purpose", was to expose "the misuse of public
funds," - "inherently of interest to the public") with Zaky v. United States Veterans
Admin., 793 F.2d 832, 836, 838 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986) ("point" of
employee's speech "appear[ed] in the context of [his] protecting his job, a matter of
personal interest"). Cf. Bausworth v. Hazelwood School Dist., 986 F.2d 1197, 1198
(8th Cir. 1993). "In making our examination [of whether the speech in question is of
public concern] we focus on the employee's role in conveying the speech rather than
the public's interest in the speech's topic." Id. (emphasis added).
242. 854 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1988) (Bauer, C.J.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053 (1989).
243. The speech alleged wrongdoing by a high official in the school - a ground for
public concern expressly identified in Connick. Id. at 239, 243. See supra note 112
and accompanying text.
244. Berg, 854 F.2d at 242. The court used Connick to justify its sifting of the public
elements of the speech from its "inexorably" private contents by noting that the Court
in Connick itself had sifted one public speech element from among numerous private
elements. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
.245. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
246. DEWEY, supra note 12, at 15-16 (emphasis added). See supra note 164 and
accompanying text.
247. DEWEY, supra note 12, at 12. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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zation plan in Callaway248 were plainly public in nature (provided at a
minimum that her allegations of retaliation under the school reorganization plan and her complaints of sexual harassment were causally
linked 249), because the societal origins of sexual discrimination defy
private control and require the "systematic care" and control of the
public,2 5 ° completely apart from the motivation of the speaker who
brings an instance of this discrimination to the public's attention. The
putative corruption of a public official, 25 ' identified by the speaker in
Berg,252 is public under both Dewey's method and the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Connick,253 despite the speaker's own narrow
motivation for speaking about the corruption.2 5 4 Only Dewey, however, has a consistent explanation for treating the speech in both Callaway and Berg as protected public speech.
The subjective motivation simpliciter of the speaker is also not controlling under Arendt, but for a different reason. Genuine public
speech is subjective in nature, because spontaneous self-expression,25 5
among the most authentic of human experiences, can fully appear
only in a public world.25 6 Private matters, to be sure, cannot provide a
completely spontaneous basis for authentic self-expression because
they are, properly understood, firmly rooted in the hidden world of
necessity.2 5 7 The attack on sexual discrimination in Callaway, accordingly, does not lose its public importance. simply because it was expressed in an individual, subjective manner and thus grew out of the
speaker's personal interest. Indeed, as indicated, this personal or existential origin - if anything - enhances the public character of the
speech. The stereotypical destruction of human uniqueness, found in
this sort of discrimination, is an attack on the vital human condition of
plurality and its concomitant condition - equality.2 5a The individual's complaint of debasement is appropriate to the common, public
248. Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987).
249. Id. at 415. Besides, the "public[ ] . . .critic[ism]," Callaway itself may well
have had other content of public concern; the court's opinion is unclear on this point.
Id. See also Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
250. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
251. See supra note 243.
252. Berg v. Hunter, 854 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053 (1989).
253. Id. at 239, 243.
254. The extent to which the "taint" of private motivation may reach is revealed in
Knowlton v. Greenwood Indep. Sch. Dist., 957 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1992). There
the court of appeals held that the public employees' First Amendment claims were
barred because private concerns had motivated their speech about pay and working
conditions, despite the fact that the court upheld the public employer's liability for
Fair Labor Standards Act wage-and-hourly violations and its violation of the Texas
Whistle Blower Act, which protects public employees from retaliation for reporting
violations of law by .their employer.
255. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 184, 188 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 187, 188 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 190, 191 and accompanying text.
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world of spontaneous self-expression. From Arendt's existentialist
perspective, such a protest is fully genuine only as the speaker's
unique response to her situation. Corruption by public officials, as in
Berg, also threatens the conditions of a common world of spontaneous
actors and speakers by subjecting them to manipulation through private - usually economic - necessity. Repudiation of such corruption thus does not lose its public nature because of its relation to the
speaker's rational self-interest.
Taken together in their alternative objective and subjective viewpoints, Dewey and Arendt explain the irrelevance of gauging the
speaker's subjective motivation, so long as the speaker's remarks meet
their respective standards of public speech. Here they converge in
two concrete cases, Callaway and Berg, in the sense that their respective philosophies - while maintaining doctrinal distinctness - can
each explain adequately why the speech in both of these cases should
be considered public. Accordingly, taken together, Dewey and Arendt extend the concept of public speech to Callaway, while validating
and verifying the grounds for recognition of public speech in both
cases. Nor is Lippmann's approach, transcendent or nonempirical in
nfitwh
with these empirical approaches of disregarding
nature,259 in conflict
the motivation of speech in classifying it as public. The issue of feminine equality implicated in Callaway is, for example, addressed in a
transcendent ideal, 6 ° and therefore is a part of the public world of
universal ideas so long as it is not ultimately clouded or concealed by
the passion of its particular expression. 26 '
(2) The "Balancing" Approach
Similar confusion about the role of subjective purpose appears in
the cases of the Third Circuit. In Rode v. Dellarciprete262 the Third
Circuit (purporting to follow Connick) stated that "[c]omplete reliance on [the employee's] motivation for speaking is inappropriate. 263
There the employee "did not merely claim that she was being mistreated [subjective private purpose][;] she claimed that she was a victim of retaliation arising out of racial animus [-] a matter of grave
public concern. ' '26 In Czurlanis v. Albanese2 65 the same court had
held that "the motivations underlying" a particular employee's speech
would not control the case, especially in view of the fact that its content did not concern "his pay, his hours, or the conditions of his em259. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.

260. See e.g., Plato, Republic, reprinted in THE

COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO

696, 705 (Edith Hamilton et al. eds. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1961) (addressing
equal treatment of women in the ideal state).
261. See, e.g., supra note 203 and accompanying text.
262. 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988).
263. Id. at 1201 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 1201.
265. 721 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1983).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol1/iss1/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V1.I1.1

50

Gray: Public and Private Speech: Toward a Practice of Pluralistic Conve

1994]

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPEECH

ployment" but instead inefficient government operations, a public
subject. 266 The intimation was, however, that the employee's motivation for speaking might have controlled the case, had the speech concerned his "pay... hours, or... conditions of... employment" more
than it concerned government inefficiency. Finally, the court in
Zamboni v. Stamler2 67 (relying on Rode) rejected an argument that
the speech was private simply because the employee had a "singular
purpose - to invalidate a promotional plan that was adverse to
him. '2 68 Despite its finding "that the [employee] had a personal stake
in the speech at issue," the court held that the employee's speech was
public because "the comments [that] precipitated the retaliatory actions were made not only in a private meeting . ..but also to the
appropriate officials who were in a position to redress [those]
actions. "269
In these cases the Third Circuit has gone beyond the approach of
the Seventh Circuit in Callaway. Instead of merely using any admixture of private motivation to condemn the employee's speech to private status, the Third Circuit implicitly balances the subjective
purpose of the speech with other factors (chiefly the content of the
speech as reflected in its importance to the public at large) to arrive at
the determination of the speech's public or private nature under
prong one or the threshold of the Connick test.270 Under Connick,
however, only the second prong or stage of analysis (as modeled on
Pickering) entails the balancing approach.271 At this second point in
the Connick analysis, the employee's civic interest in the speech, if
already recognized under prong one, is then balanced against the employer's interests in efficiency and workplace discipline to decide
whether the speech will be given effective protection. The Third Circuit is not the only court of appeals to expand this balancing approach
to decide the issue formulated in Connick's first prong.272
In Gonzalez v. Benavides273 the Fifth Circuit held that "[w]e do not
read Connick ...to exclude the possibility that an issue of private
266. Id. at 104. The court in Rode relied on this part of Czurlanis,distinguishing it
from the Seventh Circuit's treatment of motivation in Callaway. See Rode, 845 F.2d
at 1201.
267. 847 F.2d 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 899 (1988).

268. Id. at 77.
269. Id. at 78.
270. But cf Versarge v. Township of Clinton, New Jersey, 984 F.2d 1359, 1366 (3d
Cir. 1993) (only after the threshold prong-one question of public speech is decided

does the general public's interest in the speech come into play as additional weight in
prong-two balancing, for the employee's interest and against the public employer's

interest).
271. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
272. But cf. Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443, 451 (3d Cir. 1985) ("If, in fact,
the employee's speech is largely composed of matters of only personal concern, that
becomes relevant when the [Pickering-style] balancing is done, not in the [prong-one]
determination whether the speech touches upon matters of public concern.").
273. 774 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985) (Wisdom, J.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986).
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concern to the employee may also be an issue of public concern. 2' 74
The court, in a footnote, revealed its methodology for deciding such
" 'mixed' issues of both public and private concern" :275 "Case-by-case
adjudication requires consideration of 'the whole record', including
the 'context' of the speech, to determine whether the speaker addressed an issue of ... public concern. 2' 76 It added, finally, that "because public employees speak in a great variety of circumstances,
individual balancing [on prong one of Connick] seems preferable to a
predictable but inflexible categorical approach. 2 77 In ruling for individual case-by-case balancing td determine the constitutional validity
of restrictions on speech content, the court departed from the
Supreme Court's approach of broad classification and categorical balancing to resolve this issue. 278 The Fifth Circuit's opinion thus raises
the question sub silentio of whether Connick's prong-one requirement, as applied in lower-court cases like Gonzalez, departs from the
usual Court-sanctioned method of categorical balancing to determine
the constitutionality of proscriptions on the communicative content of
speech. The Gonzalez court would have us reduce Connick to ad hoc
balancing on both of its prongs without recognition that public speech
can be recognized by its content alone under the usual categorical approach. Before, however, this question of departure from categorical
balancing can be resolved - principally by bringing the clarifying
powers of pluralistic convergence to bear directly on Connick's own
ambiguities - I must analyze a few other lower courts' handling of
contextual subjective purpose to see whether their treatments fit the
pattern already established.
(3) Confusion and Conflict in the Lower Courts
I do not analyze the quite extensive lower-court case law exhaustively or in detail, but only enough to show that the patterns already
described of treating motivation are both recurrent and in confusing
conflict. The Seventh Circuit's approach of finding otherwise public
speech to be "tainted" -

again, my choice of words -

by the pres-

ence of any personal motivation2 79 has also appeared in a decision of
the Eleventh Circuit,28 0 where that court held that a public school
teacher's personal concerns about enforcing classroom discipline
"tainted" his statements about school administration; statements
which -

when otherwise expressed by the faculty as a whole -

en-

274. Id. at 1300-01.
275. Id. at 1301.
276. Id. at 1301 n.10 (emphasis added).

277. Id. at 1303.
278. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
280. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1986).
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joyed the high value of public speech."' 1 Other circuits, like the Third,
Fifth, and Sixth, have

-

on occasion

-

used the "balancing" ap-

282
proach. For example, the Sixth Circuit in Brown v. City of Trenton

determined the nature of the speech by balancing the speaker's "inter-

est qua employee" against "any interest he might have as a member of
the general public," and finding the former to be the weightier of the
two, disclaimed "any need for further [Connick prong-two or Picker-

ing-style] 'balancing.' 1283 The "balancing" technique is also followed
in the Tenth Circuit. 284 Some circuits are even in conflict with themselves: e.g., the Seventh28 and the Third.2 86 A few courts have used

the categorical method to determine the prong-one nature of the
speech in question: e.g., the Third Circuit287 and a district court within
the Fifth Circuit. 288 It is this last technique -

broad classification and

that is supported by Connick, when that case is
categorization
properly interpreted in the light of Court precedents and "context" is
-

given a meaning consistent with these precedents. The framework of
convergence, in the way it handles "context" understood as personal
motivation, is consistent with the Court's accepted methodology.

281. Id. at 1510, 1516 (by implication). Accord, Arvinger v. Mayor and City Councilof Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 77-79 (4th Cir. 1988) (employee's personal motivation
arguably "tainted" his testimony in a fair employment hearing, indicating that testimony before such hearings is usually of strong public concern). See infra notes 355-61
and accompanying text.
282. 867 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1989).
283. Id. at 321-22 (emphasis added).
284. See, e.g., Conaway v.' Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 795-96 (10th Cir. 1988) (speaker's
public and private purposes for his criticisms of the public employer are balanced).
Cf. Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 817 (10th Cir. 1989) (purporting to follow Conaway, where "[pilaintiff testified that her motive in speaking out ... was not purely
personal, but stemmed from her concerns as a member of the community" (emphasis
added)).
285. Compare the "tainted" approach in Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414 (7th
Cir. 1987), with the arguably "balancing" position in Berg v. Hunter, 854 F.2d 238 (7th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053 (1989), and with Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892
F.2d 1298, 1302 (7th Cir. 1990) (arguably either "balancing" or categorical in methodology, but not Callaway-style "taint").
286. Compare the "balancing" approach of Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98 (3d
Cir. 1983), Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988), and Zamboni v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 899 (1988), with the categorical approach of Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1985).
287. See Johnson, 776 F.2d 443, 451 (3rd Cir. 1985).
288. Schweitzer v. University of Texas Health Center at Tyler, 688 F. Supp. 278, 282
(E.D. Tex. 1988) (Justice, J.)("[The employee's] personal interest in the concern that
she expressed does not derogate her claim to First Amendment protection [before the
application of Pickering-style balancing] ....When the topic of the speech is plainly a
matter of public interest, it is of little import that the speaker also has a personal
interest in it."). Cf.Wilson v. UT Health Center, 973 F.2d 1263, 1269 (5th Cir. 1992)
(reading Connick not to exclude protection for a public employee's speech when it
involves a mixture of issues of both public and private concern), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
1644 (1993).
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(4) Resolution of the Role of Context in Connick
I have already examined how pluralistic convergence can resolve a
conflict about "context" in a lower federal court. 289 Now I trace the
grounds of that conflict into Connick itself and attempt to resolve the
ambiguous role of "context" at its very source.
Critical portions of the Connick opinion are arguably consistent
with treating "context" as subjective motivation and as incorporating
it directly into the evaluation of whether the speech in question is
public or private. Consider, e.g.:
Indeed, the questionnaire ... convey[s] no information at all other
than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo....
reflect[ing] one employee's dissatisfaction with a transfer .... 290
The passage directly implies that the employee's personal, subjective
purpose is relevant to or even controlling in the prong-one inquiry; yet
the Court enters a seemingly identical association of "context" with
personal motivation on the prong-two balancing side of its analysis.2 9 1
Indeed, Justice Brennan, in dissent, protested that the Court had invalidly "weighed [context] twice - first in determining whether an
employee's speech addresse[d] a matter of public concern and then in
deciding whether the statement adversely affected the government's
292
interest as an employer.
The upshot is that "context" construed as subjective motive does
not belong on the prong-one side of Connick. The Court's traditional
methodology of categorical balancing to protect classes of speech eschews this factor,29 3 and our figures employed in pluralistic convergence theory have also ruled out any material role for motivation at
this stage of the analysis. 294 The Court itself, in the milieu of assessing
tort liability for remarks about public figures, has expressly ruled out
any reliance on a speaker's subjective purpose - considered as "illwill or selfish political motives ' 295 - for withdrawing constitutional
protection from his speech.2 96 Yet, as I have shown, the lower courts
289. See supra notes 237-61 and accompanying text.
290. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983) (emphasis added).
291. Compare supra note 290 and accompanying text, with another treatment of
"context" addressed to the prong-two balancing aspect of the case: "This is not a case
where an employee, out of purely academic interest, circulated a questionnaire....

[Rather] the questionnaire emerged after a persistent dispute between Myers and
Connick ...

292.
293.
294.
295.

over office ...

policy." Connick, 461 U.S. at 153-54 (emphasis added).

Id. at 157-58 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 245-61 and accompanying text.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (distinguishing this type of sub-

jective intent from New York Times "knowledge .

.

. or ...

reckless disregard [for

truth]") (emphasis added).
296. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988). The Court stated that:
[I]n the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives
that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), we held
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have frequently picked up on Connick's equivocal and excessively
weighted, duplicative treatment of context as motivation and applied
it to the wrong part of their analyses,297 instead of confining it to the
part where balancing is accepted practice.
Other passages of Connick, moreover, support an interpretation
consistent with our figures' visions of the public and with the categorical approach to content restrictions usually followed by the Court.
For example, in finding that the aspect of Meyers' questionnaire concerning office-imposed political campaign work was a public issue, the
Court stated:
I
[T]here is a demonstrated interest in this country that government
service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than
political service.... Given this history, we believe... that the issue
of whether assistant district attorneys are pressured to work in2political campaigns is a matter of interest to the community ....

This judicial reasoning about the societal implications of such "political work" is entirely consistent with Dewey's essential understanding
of the public as comprised of those persons who are indirectly affected
by transactions requiring social control. 299 By the same token, the
Connick Court's relegation of speech about intraoffice disputes, involving personal employee grievances, to private status is consistent
with Dewey's understanding of a private transaction as one whose effects concern only those directly involved. 3°
that even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill-will his expression was protected by the First Amendment: "Debate on public issues
will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved
in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did ... utterances honestly

believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas.... ." Id., at 73, 85 S.Ct.,
at 215. Thus while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate ....
Id.
But cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)
(motivation by governmental officials can be a controlling factor in determining level
of speech protectedness when content is irresolvably equivocal on this point).
297. See Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987), Gonzalez v. Benavides,
774 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986), and supra text accompanying notes 237-41 and 273-77, respectively.
The resolution of this equivocal use of "context" may lie partly in restricting its
meaning of "subjective purpose" to the balancing aspect only, shading its meaning in
the earlier Connick prong-one analysis more toward the passive one of "surroundings," "circumstances," or "location." Cf. City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v.
Wisc. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 176 (1976) (circumstances in
which a public employer hears complaints determines the public or private nature of
those complaints), and supra text accompanying note 106.
298. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (citations omitted).
299. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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In addition, to the extent that Connick finds speech concerned
merely with one's own personal employment status to be private,3 ° '
the Court's ruling is also consistent with Arendt's assignment of underlying biological and economic processes and operations to the private realm.3 °2 Elevating such concerns to the public realm would, for
Arendt, extend undeserved public status to a "society of jobholders,"
thereby confusing the possibility of free and unique human experiences with the "sheer automatic functioning" of private economic
necessity.3 °3
Lippmann's relation to the usage of "context" in Connick is harder
to gauge, given his concern with the transcendent and the Court's
usual reliance on positivist jurisprudence; but certainly Lippmann's
disdain for particular issues formed only from the clash of individuals'
passions 3° is neither inconsistent with the Court's treatment of runof-the-mine workplace disputes, nor with the corresponding views of
our other figures on this matter.
In this manner pluralistic convergence resolves the equivocation in
the term "context" in Connick by (1) excluding its troublesome sense
of personal motivation in the prong-one threshold stage of analysis,
and by (2) identifying a meaning (or group of meanings) for the term
that is otherwise consistent with the Court's usage in that case (and
others) bearing on the issue of public speech. Insofar as "context"
refers to the subjective motivation of the speaker, its use to identify
speech as public or private should be eliminated altogether from
prong-one analysis. Thus any subjective contextual purpose of the
speaker ascribed to the passage "Indeed, the questionnaire ...

con-

vey[s] no information at all other than the fact that a single employee
is upset with the status quo ... reflecting one employee's dissatisfaction with a transfer.. .", and to other passages like it in the Connick

opinion (alluding to the employee's personal dissatisfaction), should

301. At least one court of appeals has so interpreted Connick. See Wilson v. UT
Health Center, 973 F.2d 1263, 1269 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that "the [Supreme]
Court removed from First Amendment protection only that speech that is made only
as an employee, and left intact protection for speech that is made both as an employee and as a citizen"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1644 (1993). The Fifth Circuit, at
least in this case, thus rejects the "taint" theory. But to the extent that the Fifth
Circuit in Wilson has adopted a categorical approach to prong-one analyis, it is

squarely in conflict with its own opinion in Gonzalez v. Benavides, 774 F.2d 1295 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140 (1986) in which the panel endorsed a balancing

approach. See supra notes, 273-78 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
303. ARENDT, supra note 13, at 322. Arendt would also discard from the public
realm trivial employment concerns. Cf. supra note 193 and accompanying text. Cf.
Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 1985) (employee's de-

mands for apologies from fellow workers, and complaints about his parking space,
were not matters of public concern).
304. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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be eliminated from analysis in prong one.3 °5 Ambiguity about
whether passages of this sort refer to the speaker's motivation or the
substantive quality or content of the speech is removed by eliminating
the former and selecting the latter as the perspective from which to
interpret each such passage. Both the passage quoted immediately
above and the one of a different tenor previously quoted (beginning
"there is a demonstrated interest in this country that government service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service") can then be given a common usage that focuses on the
quality or content of the speech and not simply on the motivation of
the speaker. This is a common usage that is consistent with both
Dewey's and Arendt's understandings of the distinction between the

public and the private - understandings in which the presence of subjective motivation is not decisive. Thus once one turns from the issue

of context to the issue of form or content - especially the latter quotations from Connick such as those given above shed most of their
ambiguity or equivocation because they can be readily related to sub-

stantive views of Dewey and Arendt that offer a very sharp distinction
between public and private without reference to the speaker's
motivation. °6

There is also a closely related confusion in the Connick opinion
which can be cleared up primarily from the perspective of Arendt.
The Court equates the concept of the "private" with the notion of
"personal interest" in its very holding:
We hold ...that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen
upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon
matters only of personal interest.., a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision
307
taken by a public agency ....
305. To the extent that the quotation retains any sense of private personal. motivation at all, its relevance should be confined to Connick's prong-two balancing stage.
See also supra note 297 and accompanying text (suggesting that the meaning of "context" in prong one could be shifted to "surroundings," "circumstances," or
"location").
306. Thus from a substantive, subject-matter, or "content"-based approach, both
Dewey and Arendt would rather clearly tend to see a passage such as that quoted in
the text at supra note 290, as relating to a private matter, because for Dewey it relates
to a closed, intraoffice situation involving those immediately concerned, see supra
note 164 and accompanying text, and for Arendt it relates to economic affairs and
mere job-holding. See e.g., supra note 188 and accompanying text. The second quotation, see supra note 298 and accompanying text, entailing partisian political demands
on public employees, relates, on the other hand, to Dewey's notion that the "public"
concerns the indirect consequences of events upon those beyond those immediately
involved, see supra note 164 and accompanying text, and to a number of Arendt's
substantive views, including the effect that such partisan demands could have on the
common public world of appearance and freedom. See, e.g., supra notes 190-91 and
accompanying text.
307. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
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Although the Court's equation of the "personal" with the "private"
does not appear to have contributed to any error in the specific outcome of Connick, the Court's apparently unreflective association of
the two terms displays a confusion that has been picked up by the
lower courts, where it may very well have caused error. 30 8 The point
is that, according to Arendt, all public statements must be personal in
the sense that their very authenticity proceeds from the subjectivity of
the speaker.3 °9 Spontaneity of expression associated with one's personal encounter with social reality is part and parcel of Arendt's existentialist viewpoint. While the "personal" might be associated with
Arendt's conception of the "private" as well (though in a very diminished sense because the "private" constitutes a realm in which human
freedom is greatly diminished), this possibility only points up the additional futility of using a conception of the "personal"
to identify the
"private" and to distinguish it from the "public. '310
This pluralistic resolution of ambiguity and confusion in Connick
reinforces, and is in turn reinforced by, the Court's traditional reliance
on a broad-based categorical methodology to distinguish high-value
from low-value speech.31 ' Connick is thus rid of the vexing problem
generated by including the speaker's subjective purpose, under the
name of "context," in its prong-one analysis; and the lower courts are
given a clarified precedent that
is conceptually and coherently ex312
tended to a plurality of values.
b. The Unusual Role of "Form"
The ancients thought that form is the medium through which reality
or substance becomes intelligible to human reason 313 and that form is
308. See, e.g., Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 1987) ("We agree
with the district court that [i]n this case, the context and form of the speech leads to
the inescapable conclusion that... [Callaway's] concern was personal, not public.")
(emphasis added).
309. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
310. Cf.supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's error in Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987), of treating the
speech in question as "private" simply because it reflects the subjective motivation
and situation of the speaker).
311. See, e.g., supra note 90 and accompanying text. Professor Ely also finds the
categorical approach far more protective of speech content than an approach that
directly assesses speech value by balancing it against a non-speech governmental interest. Ely, supra note 90, at 1484. Placing the balancing function outside Connick's
prong one, and employing it only at the secondary stage of prong two after the speech
value has been well defined, assures that the government will not engage in "gratuitous inhibition" of - from the standpoint of Ely's general approach - employee
speech, but rather, that its invocation of the efficiency factor will "trigger[ ] a serious
balancing of interests" in which the employee's speech interest will require a truly
strong governmental interest to outweigh it. Id. at 1486.
312. See also infra section IV.B.2.c. pluralistically broadening "content."
313. See, e.g., Plato, Timaeus, reprintedin THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO
1178 (Edith Hamilton et al. eds. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1961)
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closely identified with the essence or substance of a thing.314
Moderns, however, have severed form from substance, 315 and the
Supreme Court in Connick has followed this practice by identifying
"form" with "the manner, time, and place" of the speech 316 - an
identification involving content-neutral restrictions, those restrictions
unconcerned, in principle, with the substance of the expression. 1 7
The Court in Connick cited Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
School District3 "8 in order to amplify one instance of what it meant by
"form" - size of the audience and thus the generality of dissemination. 31 9 The choice of Givhan seems unusual because Mrs. Givhan
had spoken "privately" to an audience of one (her superior). 320 The
Connick Court, though, reaffirmed its ruling in Givhan that this particular form of expression is irrelevant to extension of constitutional
protection because "statements concerning ...racially discriminatory

policies involve[ ] a matter of public concern."' 321 The Court did not
explain, either in Connick or in Givhan itself, how treating as public
expression the remarks of a person to a very limited audience can be
reconciled with the notion that the term "public" is usually thought to
entail expression generally accessible to a wide audience.322 Because
of the focus on Givhan in explaining what "form" means in relation to
the concepts of public and private speech, the analysis of form in Connick tends to be swayed by the unusual, even paradoxical implications
of this particular usage.
Professor Schauer, who has made a valiant attempt to explain this
paradox, 23 identifies at least two plausible solutions: private (i.e., limited) expression may be identified with "the First Amendment right to
petition the government [even one official] for a redress of grievances; '324 or, "[in protecting the critic, the gadfly, the Court partially
314. Aristotle, Metaphysics, reprintedin RICHARD McKEON, THE BASIC WORKS OF
789 (1968).

ARISTOTLE

315. See, e.g., J. Locke, Essay Concerning Understanding, reprinted in LOCKE SE176-78 (S. Lamprecht ed., 1956) ("pure substance" is unknowable except
from its "qualities called accidents").
316. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983).
317. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 3, at 190-93; TRIBE, supra note 90, § 12-3, at 794.
318. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
319. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. As it did with "context," see supra note 292 and
accompanying text, the Court also counted "form" twice - once in each prong of its
analysis. Id. at 146 (prong one), and at 152-53 (prong two).
320. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412 (1979).
321. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
322. Cf. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB.AFF.
204, 206 (1972) ("Typically, the acts of expression with which a theory of 'free speech'
is concerned are addressed to a large (if not the widest possible) audience, and express propositions or attitudes thought to have a certain generality of interest.").
323. Frederick Schauer, "Private"Speech and the "Private" Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School District, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 217.
324. Id. at 238.
LECTIONS
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commit[ted] itself .to a philosophy of workplace democracy. '325 These
explanations for reconciling a very limited or "private" audience to
the expression of a public concern, when the subject matter is itself of
a public nature, are congruent with the accepted First Amendment
value of self-governance and with Dewey's pragmatic approach to
identifying and empowering a public through communication of matters of broad concern to the public's agents. They are not, however,
readily made consistent with Arendt's concept of the public, which
requires expression to be made generally to others in a public space.32 6
In order to make the idea of a private audience somewhat more
consistent with Arendt's thought, as well as to bring Lippmann into
the picture, I shall recast Schauer's Givhan analysis to show that limited dissemination of expression can nonetheless be considered as
public (1) where it is spoken or published to an agent of the public in a
representative democracy (similarly to Schauer's idea of petitioning
the government, though expanded to non-governmental listeners), or
(2) when it is privately transmitted to a person (usually a representative of the news media) with responsibility for fashioning an interconnected, coherent account of matters of concern to the general public.
(1) "Private Publication" to Agents or Representatives of
the Public
The seeming paradox embodied in the term "private publication"
can be rendered consistent with ordinary thought through Dewey's
idea that agents of the public (whether officials of the state or not)
must use information - even if privately
generated 327 - to identify
8
32
and care for the needs of the public.
For Arendt, however, "political freedom [with its essential component of self-expression in a public space], generally speaking, means
the right 'to be a [direct] participator in government,' or it means
nothing. '329 Since "the Constitution itself provide[s] a public space
325. Id. at 262.
326. Unlike Arendt, Schauer thinks that there is such a thing as private selfexpression:
Although self-expression in general is not a First Amendment value, selfexpression by communication has been so regarded in numerous opinions of
the Supreme Court .... When we focus on the interests of the speaker, it is

difficult to say that these interests are necessarily diminished by the smallness or seclusion of the audience.
Id. at 237-38 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). But cf. ARENOT, supra note 13, at
38 ("privacy" entails the "deprivation" of appearance to others in a public space).
327. "The organized community is still hesitant with reference to new ideas of a
non-technical.., nature.... A new idea is an unsettling of received beliefs; otherwise,
it would not be a new idea. This is only to say that the production of new ideas is
peculiarly a private performance." DEWEY, supra note 12, at 59 (second emphasis
added).
328. Id. at 15, 67.
329. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 218 (Penguin ed. 1979).
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only for the representatives of the people and not for the people
themselves,

'

only "the representatives of the people ...

[have] an

opportunity to engage in those activities of 'expressing, discussing, and
deciding' which in a positive sense are the activities of freedom." 33 '
So-called "private" citizens find that their opportunity to speak publicly on significant issues may be reduced from direct participation to
the indirect, quasi-public power of privately addressing and persuading the genuine public actors -

those whose words and deeds do have

a public space in which to appear. This "second best" concept of
speaking publicly does support the constitutional protection by the
Court in Givhan of the teacher's "private encounters" with the
school's principal on the indisputably public subject of racial discrimination in the school 332 - provided that the principal himself had a
'33 3
"public space" for "expressing, discussing, and deciding.

Taken together, Dewey's and Arendt's justifications for such private communications to be considered public would support such
treatment of speech to a limited audience in decisions reached otherwise in a number of lower court cases. They support, e.g., the decision
(reached, of course, on separate judicial grounds) in Wulf v. City of

Wichita,3 34 in which the Tenth Circuit found that a police officer's alle-

gations of misconduct in his department - despite his communication
of them by letter to only a single person, the state attorney general were protected public speech.335 They would support as well the
speech in Callaway v. Hafeman336 as public speech, contrary to the
Seventh Circuit, which relied on the fact that a public school adminis-

330. Id. at 238.
331. Id. at 235.
332. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
333. But cf Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that speech of nurse employee of a public hospital could be public in nature when it
had been conveyed "privately" in a personal conversation to a fellow nursing employee, who was neither the speaker's supervisor, nor a representative of the public,
nor - implicitly - a person who might have had any other basis of her own to speak
in a "public space" (citing Givhan)), vacated on other grounds, 114 S.Ct. 1878 (1994).

334. 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989).
335. Id. at 860 n.26. Accord, Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 797 (10th Cir. 1988)
(Tenth Circuit supported as public speech, on alternative grounds, employee's comments on official misconduct made privately to a high-level local official). But cf
Thomson v. Scheid, 977 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2341
(1993). Here the Court of Appeals held that a public employee's report of possible
fraud by a public official was purely a matter of "internal department policy" and thus
could not be characterized as public speech, when it was transmitted to the employee's departmental superiors. Id. This case seems to be squarely in conflict with
the Supreme Court's relevant holdings, because it, too, involves speech identified in
Connick as being of public concern (wrongdoing by public officials) and which, similarly to the speech in question in Givhan, was transmitted to the employee's superiors
with administrative responsibility.
336. 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987).
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trator complained privately to a superior about sexual harassment.337
Consistently with their understandings, Dewey and Arendt would not
support as public speech a border patrol agent's polemical letter to a
superior couched as "a personal diatribe against Hispanics [and]
Catholics. '338 "The letter did not discuss the general problem of the
rights of illegal aliens [who are Hispanics and Catholics], but merely
the... [official document] used to inform... [such aliens] of their
hearing rights. ' 33 9 For Dewey the failure of the speech to address a
...

"general problem" (as the court of appeals found) would also make it
unfit for the process of forming a public through discussion of consequences having broad effect, while for Arendt this same failure would
make the border patrol agent's remarks unfit to appear in a public
space, either directly or through an intermediary.
Private Communication Resulting in the Public's Receiving
Coherent Information About Its Concerns
As Dewey points out, "[ain inchoate public is capable of organization only when indirect consequences are perceived."340 The news media are indispensable for this vital function of informing the public; yet
they often fail:
Without coordination and consecutiveness, events are not events,
but mere occurrences, intrusions; an event implies that out of which
a happening proceeds. Hence even if we discount the influence of
private interests in procuring suppression.., we have here an explanation of the triviality and 'sensational' quality of so much of what
passes as news. The catastrophic, namely, crime, accident, family
rows, personal clashes and conflicts, are the most obvious . . .
breaches of continuity; they supply the element of shock which is
the strictest meaning of sensation; they are the new par excellence,
even though only the date of the newspaper could inform us
whether they happened last year or this, so completely are they isolated from their connections.34 '
Lippmann, from his own perspective, agrees that:
(2)

337. Id. at 415, 416. The court's explanation that the speaker herself did not want
the dispute to be made public, thus putatively canceling any civic importance which it
might have had, is inconsistent with Dewey's dictum that public speech is not dependent on the speaker's motive, see supra notes 168, 245-46 and accompanying text, and
with Arendt's theory that representatives of the public have freedom to speak and
act, and thus are not merely "glorified messenger boys" inexorably bound by the instructions of their constituents. ARENDT, supra note 329, at 237.
338. Mings v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 384, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1987). But cf
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (generally holding that
racially bigoted remarks are immune from content-based proscriptions).
339. Mings, 813 F.2d at 388 (emphasis added). The court of appeals, citing Givhan,
did hold that "[tihe fact that the ...

letter was directed to an agency official rather

than to the public at large would not preclude a finding that... [it] addressed a matter
of public concern." Id.
340. DEWEY, supra note 12, at 131 (emphasis added).
341. Id. at 180.
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Living adults share, we must believe, the same public interest. For
them, however, the public interest is mixed with ... their private

and special interests [associated with passion and sensationalism].

Put this way, we can say ... that the public interest may be pre-

sumed to be what men would choose if they saw342clearly, thought
rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently.
Thus a private communication by a public employee to a representative of the news media should be regarded as public speech, so long as
the communication is calculated to become part of an interconnected
and reasoned general disclosure to large segments of the public, and
does not merely lead to reporting of isolated, random, and sensational
happenings.
Just such a contribution to a coherent, interconnected explanation
of a matter of public concern occurred when an employee reported
incidents of racial discrimination within a public agency, "especially in
light of the prior protracted history of litigation against [the agency]
charging it with racial animus in its employment practices," as well as
a legislative investigation into the same matter.343 Similar grounds
would protect the critical remarks about police department administration, given to the press by a police officer in a private interview,
when the officer said "it's ...hard to distinguish the politicians from

the criminals," and then linked this caustic remark "to his more general criticism of [city] officials' interference in the police department's
affairs." 3"

c. The Primacy of "Content" - Major Themes
By arguing against controlling influence for either "context" (understood as the speaker's subjective motive) or "form" (understood as
breadth and scope of dissemination), I have - through negative argument or refutation - left "content" as that aspect of public speech
which, even if not altogether controlling itself, tends to be the predominant consideration in determining whether speech is public. My
position is also positively supported by the case law itself. For example, the Court in Connick elevated to the level of public speech that
part of Ms. Meyers' office questionnaire concerned with political campaign work (a matter of content or substance), despite the fact that it
had been distributed to only fifteen persons in a single government
342. LIPPMANN, supra note 14, at 42. See also id. at 126 (freedom of speech in the
public interest avoids inciting the passions of the people).
343. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (3rd Cir. 1988). The court also
found it significant that the news reporter initiated contact with the employee. I believe, however, that such a circumstance should be construed merely as evidence of
the private comment's relevance to an interconnected report of a matter of public
concern (just as the litigation and hearings were such evidence), and not as an element per se to a finding of public speech.
344. Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 F.2d 1298, 1300, 1302 (7th Cir. 1990); see also
Matulin v. Village of Lodi, 862 F.2d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 1988) (following Rode).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

63

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 3

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1

office (a matter of form).345 In Givhan the Court gave controlling
force to the public importance of the employee's words over the extremely narrow scope of their communication.346
In the course of my attempt to show the role that context and form
should have, I have also set out and amplified how the practice of
pluralistic convergence - modeled substantially after Professor McKeon's schema - can be used to arrive at stable and more definitive
criteria for finding instances of public speech. I have also attempted
to show how its acceptance dovetails with traditional Court practice in
setting up categories of speech with different degrees of constitutional
protection.347 For example, I have used the thought of Dewey and
Arendt to dispose of the need to focus on the speaker's motivation in
the name of "context," by showing that - on the one hand, for
Dewey - it is only the objective content of the speech that has public
value; 348 and that - on the, other hand, for Arendt - the very subjective uniqueness of the speech is a condition necessary for that speech
to have a public character. 349 Together with Lippmann's congruent
views on the transcendent, 350 Dewey and Arendt provide means to
escape the ambiguous or equivocal relation of "context" to public
speech in the Connick opinion.351 By the same token, I have used this
approach to remove a paradox in the relation of "form" to public
speech, when that352term is used to encompass the unusual Givhan
sense of "private."
Now I intend to follow up these earlier arguments for the practical
usefulness of pluralistic convergence by focusing directly on "content"
itself - both on recurring themes and on nascent issues found in the
scattered case law. I begin with two strong issues of public policy, one
well recognized and the other reasonably well established.
(1) Issues of Heightened Public Concern
(a) Racial, Sexual, and Other Invidious Forms of Discrimination
The Supreme Court in Connick, following its precedent in Givhan,
has found that the "right to protest racial discrimination [is] a matter
...

of public concern," regardless of the form or context in which the

345. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141, 149 (1983). See supra notes 63, 243 and
accompanying text. See also Berg v. Hunter, 854 F.2d 238, 243 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1053 (1989) (misuse of public funds controls over aspects of private
employment dispute); Zamboni v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 78 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 899 (1988) (citing Connick); Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443,451
(3rd Cir. 1985).
346. See supra notes 82-83, 318-22 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 199-203, 205 and accompanying text.
351. See, e.g., supra notes 299-306.
352. See, e.g., supra notes 327-44.
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protest occurs.35 3 I have already shown in one area of invidious discrimination - sexual discrimination - how our three figures and

their thought can converge to make such protests of a public character: for Dewey, racism and other forms of stereotypical discrimination
are of a social origin that requires systematic regulation by agents of
the public; for Arendt, such discrimination violates the norms of individual uniqueness and of human plurality in a common world; and for
Lippmann, the relegation of treatment of persons to irrational stereotyping violates the transcendent ground of rational values.354
The lower federal courts, from their judicial perspective, have illustrated the importance of these issues as matters of public concern. In
Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control District,355 the Fifth Circuit

found that a public employee's testimony before an Equal Employment Opportunity hearing in a closed meeting of the county commissioner's court, despite the fact that a personnel dispute about another
employee's private interest was involved, constituted a matter of public concern under the First Amendment, as well as implicating section
703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.356 Section 703(a)

protects an employee from disciplinary action for charging or assisting
in a charge of racial, sexual, or other unlawful discrimination under
Title VII.35 7 Thus speech about racial discrimination and sexual discrimination 31 in a public job are plainly of public concern, and the
353. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8 (dictum).
354. See supra notes 164, 191, 201-02 and accompanying text.
355. 869 F.2d 1565 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
356. Id. at 1577 (construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a) (1982)).
For public employees, the circuits are split over whether the filing of an EEOC
charge and a civil rights lawsuit are inherently protected by the First Amendment.
Compare Yatvin v. Madison Metro. School Dist., 840 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988) (First
Amendment issue depends on facts of each case) with Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d
448 (8th Cir. 1985) (First Amendment protects filing of lawsuit and charge). ABA
SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW,

1987-1989 Supp. 81 & n.37 (2d ed. 1991).
See also Wilson v. UT Health Center, 973 F.2d 1263, 1270 (5th Cir.1992) (holding
that failure of public employee's claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) does not
vitiate a First Amendment claim based on the same incident).
357. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1)&(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1)&(2) for the primary proscriptions on such discrimination in employment.
358. See supra notes 237-39, and accompanying text. See also Starrett v. Wadley,
876 F.2d 808, 812, 814, 816 (10th Cir. 1989) (employee's complaint of sexual harassment unchallenged as a matter of public concern); Matulin v. Village of Lodi, 862 F.2d
609, 612-13 (6th Cir. 1988). In Starrettthe court of appeals complained that the public
agency's "brief on appeal demonstrates shocking obliviousness to the menace of sexual harassment in the workplace." Starrett,76 F.2d at 815. The brief stated, inter alia:
[I]f an improper remark is passed in the office or if the boss gets drunk and
makes a pass at a secretary, whether serious or not, it's a jury question and a
feast of lawyer's fees ....
How much is it worth to a plaintiff if her boss flips her the finger? How
much if she "thinks" he made an obscene gesture?... How much per pinch
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statutory policies against them carry over to section 1983359 constitutional free-speech actions. Speech about other types of statutorily
prohibited workplace discrimination, including discrimination against
persons with disabilities,360 would also be protected.36 '
(b) Judicial,Legislative, and Administrative Proceedings
Where proceedings designed to bring certain matters to public light
are concerned, "content" becomes closely associated with the process
of airing and resolving the issues that emerge in these proceedings.
John Hart Ely's focus on constitutional process in general, and in particular his view that "[t]he expression-related provisions of the First
Amendment . . .[serve the process of] ensur[ing] the open and informed discussion of political issues, ' ' 362 is an example of this kind of

merger of substantive norms into process. By the same token Dewey
and Arendt also tend to view the process simpliciter of public speech
as the source of public values. In contrast, Lippmann sees substantive
truths that exist apart from human discourse, although informed and
reasoned discussion is certainly a means of approaching these
truths.363

The Supreme Court, from its perspective, emphasized the value of
process in conferring content protection on employees' speech in City
of Madison, Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,3 1 when it overturned the proscription that a Wisconsin statute - as interpreted by that state's labor relations agency
and its supreme court - placed on rank-and-file school employees'
addressing the school board about negotiations with the union. The
teacher who was affected had addressed the school board not merely
as one of its employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to
express his views on an important decision of his government.
Where the state has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement
[in agency proceedings], it is difficult to find justification for excludon the rear? ...Is this the sort of raw meat that should be thrown to a jury
with no more ... instruction than to do right?

Id. at 815 n.9.
359. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
360. Matulin v. Village of Lodi, 862 F.2d at 612-13. For statutory proscriptions
against disability discrimination, see sections 501(b), 503 & 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(b), 793 & 794(a); tit. I, §§ 101-08 of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 & note 12117 (1990).
361. But cf. Knowlton v. Greenwood Indep. Sch. Dist., 957 F.2d 1172, 1177 (5th Cir.
1992) (school employees complaining of unpaid work in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., held to have engaged in private speech
only).
362. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
93-94 (1980).
363. See LiPPMANN, supra note 14, at 124-25.
364. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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ing teachers .

.

who are most vitally concerned with the

proceedings ....
...

Whatever its duties as an employer, when the board sits in

public meetings to conduct public business and hear the views of
citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between speakers on
the basis of their employment, or the content of their speech.365
Thus content protection becomes identified with the process itself of
"hearing the views of citizens" in a forum set aside for this purpose.
A court of appeals has even extended this process-based protection
of an employee's speech to proceedings before a closed meeting of an
administrative body.36 6 In the same manner the right of a public employee to participate in the judicial process is protected. So in a case
where a police officer both furnished exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant's attorney and subsequently testified at trial on the subject of the defendant's guilt or innocence, his speech was protected
under Connick.3 6 7

Such protection also extends to legislative hearings. In Patteson v.
Johnson,3 68 the Eighth Circuit held that the Nebraska deputy state au-

ditor's invited testimony, before a state legislative committee where
he favored passage of a public bill to require the state auditor to be a
certified public accountant, constituted public speech. "[A]s a citizen,
as a deputy auditor, and as a CPA, Patteson had a legitimate and substantial interest in speaking his support for the proposed legislation
to questions ...
and to speak truthfully in direct response
legislation. 3 69

which re-

lated to the proposed

(2) Self-Expression
Despite Justice Brandeis' famous encomium to the value of selfexpression in realizing political liberty,37° commentators have had
some difficulty in properly locating self-expression in the pantheon of
First Amendment values. Dean Stone, for example, seems to assign a
365. Id. at 175-76 (footnote omitted) (all emphasis added).
366. Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1577-78 (5th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). But cf. Arvinger v. Mayor of Baltimore,
862 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1988) (employee's testimony at co-worker's fair employment
hearing was not found to be of public concern).
367. Melton v. Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 711, 713-14 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated
in nonrelevant part on rehearingen banc, 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 296 (1991). Accord, Buzek v. County of Saunders, Nebraska, 972 F.2d 992,
994, 995 (8th Cir. 1992) (public employee's letter to judge about "[t]he proper sentencing of [a] convicted criminal[ ] is clearly a matter of public concern").
368. 787 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986).
369. Patteson,787 F.2d at 1248 (quoting from the district court's memorandum decision). See also Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, Florida, 971 F.2d 708, 712 (11th Cir.
1992) (per curiam) (public employee's speech was clearly a matter of public concern
when it was about the unlawful expenditure of public funds and was expressed in
testimony before the city's legislative body and in statements to an investigator from
the public prosecutor's office).
370. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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lower value or a restricted field of First Amendment application to
self-expression. "Unlike the self-governance and search for truth theories, the self-fulfillment theory does not turn on competition among
ideas. ' 371 Besides seeming to agree with Schauer that there is such a
thing as "private" self-expression needing no public space for its revelation to others,3 7 2 Stone fails to note that the "self" itself is an idea in
its liberal, Lockean connotation.3 7 3 Furthermore, Dewey's idea of the

"self" - unlike the Lockean concept of isolated mental substances
having no natural social interconnections 374 - is ex proprio vigore

dependent on relations to others in a socio-political, and quite plausibly competitive context. 375 Finally, constitutive self-expression as propounded by Brandeis and Arendt supports the communication and
competition of ideas - political ideas.

Obviously, then, the constitutive value of self-expression and the
instrumental value of furthering political self-governance are closely
intertwined in this inquiry, because Brandeis and Arendt exalt political self-expression.. The question of how nonpolitical self-expression
371. Stone, supra note 3, at 198 n.32.
372. Cf. Schauer, supra note 73, at 239 (asserting that private and direct communication with a government official is also protected self-expression).
373. LOCKE, supra note 315, at 186-87.
[B]y putting together the ideas of thinking, perceiving, liberty, and power of
moving themselves, and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances, as we have of material. For putting together
the ideas of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporal motion, joined to substance of which we have no distinct idea, we have
the idea of an immaterial spirit [the self] . . . . [W]hilst I know, by seeing or
hearing.., that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that
sensation; I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within
me, that sees and hears.
Id. (emphasis added).

374. LOCKE, supra note 315. See also F.S.C. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST
AND WEST: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING WORLD UNDERSTANDING 87 (1947) ("Because Locke's philosophical theory of a person as a mental substance prescribes no
relation between the persons, or mental substances, making up society, there are no
social laws prescribed, either by God or by nature.").

375.

Cf. JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT

18, 79-81, 128-31 (Modem

Library ed. 1957) (1922).
If any ... theory [which recognizes the individual self] is objectionable, the
objection is against the character or quality assigned to the self. ;..
Other persons are selves too. If one's own present experience is to be
depreciated in its meaning because it centers in a self, why act for the welfare of others?...
To say that the welfare of others, like our own, consists in a widening and
deepening of the perceptions that give activity its meaning, in an educative
growth [of the self], is to set forth a proposition of political import.
Id. at 269-70 (emphasis added).
Cf. Arendt, Revolution and Public Happiness, 30 COMMENTARY 413 (1960) ("[Tlhe
contents of the [original] Constitution - that is, the creation and partition of power
... [gave] rise [to] a new realm where, in the words of Madison, 'ambition would be
checked by ambition' (the ambition, of course to excel and be of 'significance,' not the
ambition to make a career)."). Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
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should be addressed also arises. This issue is more difficult because of
the meagre stock of case law which can be considered on point. Our
figures, however, have indicated that nonpolitical expression does
have a role in defining or serving "the public."37' 6

Unfortunately, as I have indicated, there are very few cases that
seem to turn on self-expression, in either its political or nonpolitical
sense, in drawing the public/private speech distinction. In one such

37 7
a police officer, who had
case, Wilson v. City of Littleton, Colorado,

"shrouded" his badge with a black band out of respect for a policewoman in another town who had died in the line of duty, was discharged
after his refusal to remove it. The court held that his symbolic expression was not public in value because the officer's "personal feeling of
grief is not a matter 'of public concern' within the meaning of Connick. ' 378 Here the court, on judicial grounds, found the officer's
seemingly unobtrusive display not to be public on what appears to
have been an unduly narrow basis. In contrast, the deaths of police
officers in enforcing order in society is of public concern both under
Dewey's need to examine problems of general social importance and
under Arendt's need to provide a public space for concerns other than
the banal or the trivial. The fact a police officer has died in the line of
duty is not trivial, and the fact that an expression of grief is "personal"
simply adds to its authenticity. Moreover, the officer's display of grief
did not seem to occupy a disproportionate space in the public realm
and showed no tendency to hinder efficient police operations.
The court of appeals in one case, on the other hand, went further
than Dewey and Arendt would appear to go in extending publicspeech status to self-expression. In Berger v. Battaglia,3 79 the Balti-

more police department had disciplined an officer for his off-duty performance in so-called "blackface" comedy, though his performance
did not directly offer any comment on police operations.38° Purporting to apply the Connick test, the court held that "Berger's performances clearly were not purely personal expressions of no concern to
the community. Rather, they constituted speech upon a matter of obvious public interest to those considerable segments of the community
381
who willingly attended and sometimes paid to see and hear them.
To the contrary, although a purely "private" citizen might well engage in "blackface" entertainment, especially in view of the Supreme
376. See supra notes 178-79, 194 and accompanying text.
377. 732 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1984).
378. Id. at 768-69. The court found that, "[had] a police officer [been] shot during
an ongoing public controversy over the expenditure of public funds to purchase bullet-proof vests for the police force, the topic of police officers' deaths clearly would be

of general interest." Id. at 769 n.2.
379. 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985), icert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986).

380. Id. at 993.
381. Id. at 999.
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Court's recent holding in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul38 2 that racial stereotypes and invective can be protected from content-based proscription, a police officer's use of offensive stereotyping is distinguishable
from the former situation because it can encourage the general public
to associate bigotry with the very public institution charged with
"front-line" maintenance of law and order. Indeed, on judicial
grounds as well, such speech by a police officer could well fall outside
the scope of full First Amendment protection, without regard to its
content as such, because of its unfavorable "secondary effect" on the
public's perception of the police force.38 3 From both Dewey's and Arendt's perspectives, a proper evaluation of the officer's "expression"
should also have considered as decisive the danger that such expression would have conveyed a perception of official condonation of racism to persons (either inside or outside the department) who knew
the official identity of the "blackface" actor. Public perceptions of
bigotry in the police would be inimical both to Dewey's requirement
that public organs must be shaped by the rational needs of the public
and to Arendt's concept of a public space where a plurality of free and
equal persons can appear.3 8 4

382. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
383. Id. at 2546 (citing the "secondary effects" doctrine of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), as a ground for withholding content protection).
384. Arguably this type of analysis of Battaglia, as offered by me, tends to shift
away from Connick's prong-one emphasis on the nature of the speech to prong-two
disruptive-effects balancing. This is the approach taken by the court of appeals in
Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1992). There an employee of a public agency - the function of which was "to foster [mutual] understanding and tolerance among all of Miami's ethnic groups" - gave an off-duty
sermon negative toward Hispanics, in his capacity as a Baptist preacher. Id. at 1238.
The court held that the sermon met the prong-one public-concern threshold, Id. at
1237, but went on to hold that the "substantive danger posed by the speech to the
agency's successful functioning" outweighed, in prong-two analysis, the employee's
interest in free speech. Id. at 1237-38.
See also Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989), in which certain police
officers were disciplined for their off-duty operation of a video store selling sexually
explicit (but nonobscene) video cassettes. The court of appeals found that their freespeech rights had been violated. It held that "[T]he public concern prong of the Pickering/Connick test cannot be applied to a case of nonverbal expression that does not
occur at work or is not about work," and thus the officers' "expression" could not be
prohibited through the application of this test. Id. at 1564. In the alternative, and
directly relevant to the issue discussed in this note, it held that under Supreme Court
precedents this type of expression has sufficient protection to outweigh, in stage-two
Connick balancing, any adverse effect on the officers' employment. Id. at 1565-67. It
should be noted that the police chief had expressed his concern that "if members of
the public knew that officers were renting [such materials], negative public feelings
about the distribution of sexually explicit films would erode the public's respect and
confidence in the police department." Id. at 1566.
Nonetheless, the positions taken by Dewey, Arendt, and Lippmann seem comprehensive enough to encompass the effect of speech upon the public realm within their
very conceptions of what public speech means. Thus keeping this kind of "effects"
test within prong-one definitional analysis seems appropriate.
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Berger v. Battaglia is both unusual and important for this inquiry
because it seems to be a case in which a court of appeals used a form
of artisitic, nonpolitical expression to label self-expression as public
speech. Though both Dewey and Arendt are open to treating
nonpolitical expression as speech of concern to the public,3 85 Berger v.
Battaglia is not, for the reasons given above, a case that would illustrate their views on this matter.
(3) Exclusion of the Banal, the Trivial, and the Sensational from
the Public Realm
I have by now visited and revisited our figures' convictions that the
trivial, the banal, the merely titillating, are not within the realm of the
public.3 86 One case, Swank v. Smart, 87 seems to epitomize the convergence of judicial reasoning with our figures' thinking on this point.
A police officer was discharged for "conduct unbecoming an officer"
when he, while off duty, "picked up" a seventeen-year-old girl for a
late-night ride on his motorcycle. The officer charged that his resulting dismissal "deprived him of his freedom of speech, freedom of locomotion, and freedom of association."3 8' 8 Judge Posner quickly
dispatched the free-speech claim:
Casual chit-chat [-] a conversation idle or flirtatious in character
[-] ...is unrelated.., to the marketplace of ideas ....and is not
protected. Such conversation is important to its participants but not
to... [the] objectives, values, and consequences of... speech that is
protected by the First Amendment.3 89
Judge Posner's holding may be interpreted to follow Professor
Schauer's observation that some speech is "covered [but] not necessarily protected" under the First Amendment. 39° Private speech such
as these "flirtatious" trivia may be "covered" (unlike, e.g., so-called
"fighting words" and obscenity, which are totally stripped of First

Amendment "coverage "391); but because of its low value it may not
always be "protected," especially when balanced in the matrix of Connick/Pickering counter-values.3
Having considered the application of the pluralist approach to public and private speech in public employment, I now turn to its application in the constitutional law of defamation.
385. See supra notes 178-79, 194 and accompanying text.

386. See supra notes 173-75 (Dewey); 193 (Arendt); and 203 (Lippmann) and accompanying text.
387. 898 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 147 (1990).
388. Id. at 1250.
389. Id. at 1251 (emphasis added).
390. Schauer, supra note 73, at 228.
391. Id. (especially nn.49-50 and accompanying text). See also Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
392. See Schauer, supra note 73, at 228.
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C. Defamation
As I have already explained, 393 the Supreme Court - beginning
with its landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan394 began to impose a constitutional grid on the common law of defamation by which the plaintiff, depending on his public or private status as
the person putatively defamed, is required to show various states of
mind by the defendant in order to prove up his case. As the law of
constitutional defamation has subsequently evolved, two major factors
- the quality of the speech as public or private (as that quality relates
to the constitutional value of the speech) and the status of the person
targeted by the speaker's words (as that status bears on the targeted
person's state-law reputational interest) - have been balanced to arrive at the required state of mind of the speaker who is the defendant.
In Rosenbloom,39 5 Gertz,39 6 and finally Greenmoss Builders,3 97 the

Court zig-zagged between giving prominence to the nature of the
speech or to the status of the speaker's target in determining whether
"actual malice", "fault", or strict liability would establish the plaintiff's required proof of the speaker's state of mind (or, in the case of
strict liability, no proof of state of mind at all). Thus in some sense
balancing is going on in the constitutional defamation cases, similar to
the balancing in Connick. This balancing is analogous to Connick's
because the weight given to the public or private nature of the assertedly defamatory speech corresponds to the weight given to speech
found to be public in the first prong of Connick when it is placed on
the prong-two scales derived from Pickering. Similarly, the factor of
the public or private status of the person allegedly defamed (which
relates to the speech-neutral interest of state-law protection for the
interest in reputation identified in Gertz) corresponds to the speech
neutral interest of governmental efficiency which is placed in Connick's prong-two
scales to counterbalance the public value of the
39 8
speech itself.

393. See supra notes 125-46 and accompanying text.
394. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
395. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
396. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
397. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
398. Dean Stone implies that some kind of "balancing" between the nature and
value of the speech and opposing factors occurs and is of the broad categorical type.

See Stone, supra note 3, at 25. The class of speech consisting of "false statements of
fact" is given low value in Gertz. Id. at 194 & n.15. "[C]ategorical balancing ...
defines the precise circumstances in which the speech may be restricted." Id. at 195.
Professor Tribe, on the other hand, seems to acknowledge, at least in the case of
Greenmoss Builders, that the balancing of interests can be ad hoc. TRIBE, supra note
90, at § 12-13, 878 & n.32. "Where the law is closely confined to the narrow [state-

law] purpose of compensating private individuals for injury to their reputational interests, the law is aimed at something other than.content .... Defamation law in this
sense is ideologically neutral, and therefore is remitted to a [case-by-case] balancing

test." Id.
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Professor Tribe explains how the difficulty of identifying the nature
of "public speech" has become manifest in the defamation cases:
As Dun & Bradstreet [v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.] so clearly
demonstrated, the Gertz Court hardly settled all the issues on the
non-public side of libel law [i.e., the issues related to the public or
private status of the person allegedly defamed and his interest in
reputation]. The courts have scarcely begun the task of differentiating between [the distinct] issues [of whether speech is] of public...
[or] private concern - a subject one can fairly assume will give
judges at least as much difficulty as the public figure-private figure
distinction.3 99

Because Greenmoss Builders incorporated the public/private rationale

of Connick,4 ° the McKeonite schema for fixing common terms with
shared meanings for public and private speech in the public employment cases may be transferred to the defamation cases intact. Unlike

the former class of cases, however, I do make an attempt to explore
the role of the non-speech element to be balanced against the nature

of the speech

-

here, the public or private status of the speaker's

target and that person's corresponding content-neutral state-law interest in reputation. 40 1 Besides generally clearing up the definitional

contours of public and private speech, my more specific aim is to complete the logical schema of the categories of protectedness in constitu-

tionalized defamation law, announced but left incomplete in Hepps,4 °2
by showing the converse of Gertz, viz., that private speech can be associated with public figures. 40 3 This part of the schema - matching private speech with a public figure - was, of course, left incomplete in
my earlier formulation of the Hepps schema.

399. TRIBE, supra note 90, at § 12-13, 882.
400. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
401. I go beyond the scope of my inquiry into the Connick genre of cases, see supra
notes 90-91 and accompanying text, because the problem addressed here is somewhat
different from the problem addressed in Connick. There the problem was to identify
the analytically distinct basis for labeling speech "public" under prong one. Here the
problem is defined differently because I have adopted, as the problem for resolution,
the completion of the schema in Hepps. That problem requires not merely a resolution of what public speech is (though this is certainly an issue carried over from my
analysis of Connick), but also (in addition) a resolution of how the state-of-mind element in a defamation case is determined by the relation (as balanced) between (1) the
public or private nature of the speech in question, and (2) the plaintiff's contentneutral interest in reputation (as derived from his own public or private status).
Stated somewhat differently, while Connick and its related cases present a problem of
public speech analytically distinct from the content-neutral value ultimately weighed
against that speech, Hepps presents a problem in which those two values or elements
are too intertwined to isolate the nature of the speech for completely separate
analysis.
402. See supra notes 145, 146 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Gertz balanced the reputational
interest of the private figure against the public nature of the speech.
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One case in particular, Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,' brings
to a head this very question of whether an acknowledged public figure
exposes her entire life to the public, or retains some "hidden" life
about which "private" speech is both possible and actionable as defamatory. Andrea Dworkin, an acknowledged feminist and public figure, putatively suffered pornographic attacks in Hustler Magazine,
and sued, inter alia, for libel. On an alternative ground for affirming
summary judgment against her, the Ninth Circuit held that Dworkin
had not proven the state-of-mind element of "actual malice" required
of a public figure in New York Times. 40 5 Evidently asserting that some
defamatory private facts (and not merely opinions or outrageous caricature 406 ) were associated with the pornographic portrayals of her,
Dworkin argued that " 'defamatory comments made [about a public
figure but] on issues not of public concern' disseminated in a 'pornographic' publication should receive no first amendment protection
[i.e., strict liability should be imposed].""4 7 The court rejected this
claim, asserting that only public speech was at issue. 4°8 Dworkin also
asked the court to extend Greenmoss "to public figure/private concern
cases."'" Had it done so, the court would have filled in (in some
manner) the logical gap that I have claimed exists in the schema devised by the Supreme Court in Hepps. The court, though, responded:
"[Wle doubt that it is possible to have speech about a public figure but
not of public concern. )410
Viewed from the perspective of both the Supreme Court and of my
philosophers of the public, both Dworkin and the court of appeals
were wrong, but in different ways. Strict liability, as urged by Dworkin, is not appropriate here on judicial grounds. Instead, the strong
reputational interest of the public target of the speaker's words concerning her private life must be balanced against the competing First
Amendment interest of the press or others in a public figure, to yield
an intermediate level for the speaker's state of mind, "fault" (usually
negligence), to be proven by the plaintiff. This reasoning is consonant
with and symmetrical to the balancing approach taken in Gertz, where
a First Amendment interest in dissemination of public information
was balanced against the competing interest of a private plaintiff in his
reputation, leaving an intermediate level of "fault" to be proven.4 '
404. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 812 (1989).
405. Id. at 1194.

406. See generally, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (protecting such
hyperbole as public speech).
407. Dworkin, 867 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 (1989) (second alteration added).
408. Id.
409. Id. at 1196.
410. Id. at 1197.
411. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-46 (1974).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol1/iss1/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V1.I1.1

74

Gray: Public and Private Speech: Toward a Practice of Pluralistic Conve

1994]

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPEECH

Here the same weights are balanced, but their respective assignments
to the competing interests placed in the constitutional scales are
switched. The result, as indicated, is the same: an intermediate state
of mind ("fault") between the extremes of actual malice and strict
liability.
The Ninth Circuit, moreover, was wrong in claiming that a public
figure has no private life and thus no protected reputational interest in
preserving this "hidden" domain from public scrutiny. Showing how
and why the court of appeals was wrong is critical to resolving the
problem of the logical gap in the Hepps schema, and the views of
Dewey and Arendt establish why even the most public of persons
must be deemed to have a private dimension that generates speech of
a private, not public character.
The entire point of Dewey's The Public and Its Problems is to "differentiat[e] ... political association from other forms of association

and of the 'public' from the numerous other groups of men in associa'
Issues arising from the trivia of sensationalism are, in a very
tion."412
real sense, offensive to the reasonable person, insofar as these trivia
deflect reason from its essential function of developing human freedom through rational choice and deliberation in public affairs. For
Arendt, the break between the public and private realms may be even
sharper. While the authentic self affirms its being only by display in a
public realm, there are preconditions of the self, concerned with the
biological and economic aspects of mere life, which "need to be hidden"4'13 because "[a] life spent entirely in public, [always] in the presence of others, becomes.

..

shallow. While it retains its visibility, it

loses the quality of rising into sight from some darker ground which
must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real, nonsubjective sense. '' 414 Thus even the most public man must have a private life protected from exposure to avoid the loss of the underpinnings of his public self. For both Dewey and Arendt private matters
deserve protection because their abuse through general communication ultimately debases the value of public discourse. Therefore protection of privacy itself also has a derivative First Amendment value
(as well as inherent value) to be weighed against the right of the public to have unrestricted information about their leaders and other such
figures.415
412. McKEON, supra note 9, at 233.
413. ARENDT, supra note 13, at 73.

414. Id. at 71. Cf. Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (recognizing a
fundamental right to privacy in "an intimate relation of husband and wife"). Arendt
further shares her views on privacy with Justice Brandeis, who co-authored the seminal article, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890),
acknowledged to be the root source of the various common-law actions for invasion
of privacy.
415. But cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("Exposure of the self to
others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community."). Arendt
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When the speech or printed matter portraying the public figure is
pornographic, our figures would tend to support its treatment and valuation as private speech, even if it claims no connection with the actual private facts in the public figure's life (as may have been the case
in Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.). Arendt may be taken as a case
in point. According to her views, extensive or pointed use of pornography subjects persons to necessity (because of its appeal to the sexual, the biological, and the mindless) and thus reduces the possibility
of politics where the domain of the "public," through freedom, is created and displayed. Indeed, the display of pornography makes "public" (in the sense of open to general view) the very type of thing that
ought to be kept "private" (hidden). Finally, it disrupts the private
domain itself (by its alienating impact on men, women, and children in
their familial and intimate relations) - a disturbance which has
repercussions in the public realm of politics, because in order to speak
and to act in the public space, persons must have a secure basis for
their material and biological existence.416
In a somewhat similar vein, the Supreme Court, in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone41 7 - resting on the type of analysis emphasizing the status
of the speaker, as employed in Gertz - has distinguished "public controversies" from all controversies of mere interest to the general public, ruling that "[d]issolution of a marriage [a typically private matter]
is not the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even though
the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of
[sensational or mindless] interest to some portion of the reading public."' 418 There is thus something like a convergence in viewpoint, between and among my figures' thought and the Court's legal analysis,
that some speech - though about a person well known 41 9 - is priwould strongly disagree, insofar as such "exposure" is destructive of the conditions of
life ("the private realm") that are a necessary, though not a sufficient component, of
the public realm.
416. I am indebted to my friend Vernon Visick for these insights into Arendt's
thought. The Supreme Court and constitutional scholars have, on occasion, tended
(on their own grounds) to agree with Arendt's perspective. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 732, 749-50 (1978) ("[C]ertain words depict[ing] sexual and
excretory activities in a patently offensive manner" may be restricted in the broadcast
media because of "the government's interest in the well-being of its youth and in
supporting parents claim to authority in their own household.") (citation omitted);
Brest & Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution:The Anti-Pornography
Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607, 659 (1987) ("Pornogaphy silences
women. It does not just cause violence, but is violating. Pornography is not expression depicting the subordination of women, but is the practice of subordination itself.") (alluding to the views of Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon). But cf.

Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), summarily aff'd,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (city ordinance banning pornography is an unconstitutional
viewpoint restriction on speech).
417. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
418. Id. at 455.
419. The defamed person in Firestone was held not to have been a public figure
within the strict meaning of Gertz; but, because of her great wealth, social position,
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vate, even when its effect is to excite the general interest of the people, because creating this sensationalized effect in a substantial part of
the general population is not the same as engaging in speech fit for
public concern.
The graphic result of applying this understanding of both the
Court's own reasoning, together with Arendt's and Dewey's thought,
to the completion of the Hepps schema - all in the context of the
analysis of Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. - is illustrated in Figure 2.
SPEECH CATAGORY
PRIVATE

PUBLIC

C

>

New York Times

Dworkin

Standard: "Malice"

Standard: "Fault"

Gertz

Greenmoss Builders

Standard: "Fault"

Standard: Common-Law
Strict Liability

S

(Usually Negligence)

Figure 2

The fact is that private speech can exist about a public figure; and it
should receive some degree of protection - scaled up from the intrusive standard of New York Times requiring proof of, the speaker's "actual malice", by scaling down the level for the speaker's state of mind
to "fault." This revision would protect the value of public speech by
diminishing destructive and gratuitous scrutiny into privacy. In this
resolution our own three figures converge in a general sense by defining a public order separated from private life: Dewey's concern for
forming an inchoate public by rejecting isolated sensationalism contrary to such formation; Arendt's creation of a public space by' rejecting the banal and the exposure of that meant to be "hidden;" and
Lippmann's aspiration for transcendent public values and men who
can embody them by rejecting frivolous matters unworthy of their
attention.

and her practice of giving press conferences during her highly publicized divorce, she
was certainly a person who stirred general popular interest - surely an analogue to a
constitutional public figure.
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CONCLUSION

In this article I have presented a legal problem and claimed that
philosophy is in a special position to augment conventional legal reasoning in the resolution of that problem. The problem involves sorting out broad norms of judicial creation that justify the constitutional
protection of speech in general, and then crafting from these norms
much more specific conceptions of public and private speech - conceptions only, at best, suggested by those norms - for application to
cases that have so far defied neat judicial resolution. I have argued
that a special model or prototype called practicalpluralistic convergence is adequate to this task.
In the course of my argument I have frequently operated at a high
plain of abstraction. For example, in Part I, I dealt with the seminal
views of Justices Holmes and Brandeis at a general level; but I was
required to do so in large part because of the very broad and even
philosophical nature of their, particularly Brandeis', views. In Part I,
and later in Part III, I also dealt, necessarily, in a general way with the
views of the justices and their linkages to the views of Dewey, Arendt,
and Lippmann on the nature of the public and the private. Without
these generalizations, though, I would not have been able to carry out
a critical stage of my argument - connecting judicial concepts without definite or express conceptions of the "public" and the "private"
to compatible nonlegal views that have such express and definite
conceptions.
But I have always tried to move from the general and abstract to
the particular and the concrete; that is the direction of legal reasoning,
and of philosophical reasoning as well, insofar as it is practical. In
Part II, I analyzed the decisions of the Supreme Court in public employment and defamation cases to identify the genesis of the confusion about the distinction between public and private speech. Finally,
in Part IV, after a last formulation of my understanding of convergence that places it in the particulars of concrete situations and not in
the abstract fusion of general doctrines, I brought together the various
strands of my argument and focused them on the resolution of the
specific issues in the tangled case law in the lower federal courts.
The practical worth of this venture ultimately depends on whether
that attempt in Part IV to address and resolve problems in the particular cases offers any useful insights to the legal profession in this area
of constitutional litigation. Because my analysis clears up ambiguities
and conflicts in several important regions of the law - especially
those concerned with the role of the speaker's motive in assigning or
withholding constitutional protection from his speech, and with determining whether a public figure can have private speech concerning
him under the constitutionalized law of defamation - I would argue
that there have been some useful insights. In this respect at least I
believe that I have fulfilled my initial goal of adding some coherence
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to First Amendment jurisprudence, if only in this particular corner of
it.
In the article I emphasize the value of pluralism, and argue that it
offers a more desirable approach to understanding the underpinnings
of First Amendment free-speech law than efforts to build either englobing doctrines that emphasize the comprehensiveness of one justification, such as instrumental political self-governance or constitutive
self-realization, or particularized doctrines that insist on the narrowness or exclusiveness of one such justification. In large part the support for pluralism must remain intuitive. This appeal to intuition
should have special appeal to lawyers because of their fundamental
precept of advocacy that any controversy is capable of being understood and presented from several viewpoints. The claim that pluralism is valid can also be inferred from its actual capacity to explain and
work out particular issues. Thus the test of pluralism in this setting
lies also in experience - a pragmatic test.
Finally, there is convergence itself. I have argued not only that a
plurality of free-speech justifications and corresponding views on the
"public" and the "private" exist and must be reckoned with, but also
that -

through my method of convergence -

conflicts among these

justifications and their corresponding views can be adjusted and conformed. But convergence itself has a plurality of meanings. Besides
the central thrust of working out conflicting meanings in the particularistic settings of the cases, it has at least two other senses that I have
touched upon in the argument. One of these senses of convergence
has been the congruence of resolutions, reached independently by the
courts and the philosophical writers, of particular issues posed in the
case law. For example, Dewey and Arendt, on the one hand, and the
Supreme Court, on the other, have independently arrived at very
nearly the same basis for making the distinction between an issue of
genuine public concern and an issue that merely excites the interest of
the public.42° In another sense the method of convergence that I have
420. See, e.g., supra notes 176 and 417-19 and accompanying text (discussing the
relation between Dewey's and Arendt's thought and the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), on this issue). See also, e.g., supra
notes 165-66 and accompanying text (alluding to the convergence between the independently derived views of Dewey, on the one hand, and the holdings of the Supreme
Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984), and in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940), on the other, on the nature of the distinction
between the "public" and the "private"); supra note 364 and accompanying text (alluding to the similarity of Dewey's and Arendt's views, on the one hand, and the

Supreme Court's reasoning, on the other, in City of Madison, Joint School Dist. No. 8
v. Wisc. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), on the role of the pro-

cess of discussion in composing issues of public concern); and supra notes 295-96 and
accompanying text (noting congruence between Dewey's and Arendt's views, on the
one hand, and the Supreme Court's holdings, on the other, in Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), that the
speaker's motive does not alter the protected or unprotected status of the content of
speech).
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used to resolve the meaning of public and private speech in the particular case law has been congruent with the Supreme Court's methodology of categorical balancing, its prevalent technique for at least the
past two decades for deciding whether the content of speech is
protected.42 '
These additional senses in which convergence arises, demonstrates
that philosophical reasoning and legal reasoning do indeed overlap in
some essential ways. Because such is the case, philosophy can truly be
a valuable auxiliary to the law as confronted and understood by practicing lawyers and jurists. Thus I consider the methods of philosophy
to be entirely appropriate for further inquiry in legal fields beyond the
niche of First Amendment jurisprudence where I have tested it here.
The method developed here might, for example, be used to resolve
conflict in the meanings ascribed to "equality" or to "discrimination"
in the Fourteenth Amendment or in interpretations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, insofar as both the constitutional and the
statutory provisions apply to affirmative action. It could also be used
to achieve some agreement on the nature of consitutional "liberty" or
"property" interests. Application of my method to these and other
legal problems will, however, have to wait until another day.

421. See, e.g., supra notes 3, 90, 278, 290, 311 and accompanying text.
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